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The Recycling of Justice: Transitions in




The permutations of legal principles and facts are frustratingly
incalculable. Nevertheless, predictability and stability of the law
have always been desired goals, for they serve not only those who
administer the law but also those who violate it. Thomas Sowell in
his book, Knowledge and Decisions, posited an interesting view of
criminal law as
basically a process for transmitting and evaluating knowledge
about the guilt or innocence of individuals suspected of crime. It
is also a process for transmitting to actual and potential
criminals effective knowledge of the costs of their crimes to
others . . .
Understandably then, a process based on the transmission of
knowledge with important social consequences must place a pre-
mium on accuracy, consistency and predictability; otherwise, like the
mythological Penelope, we shall be left with the enervating dilemma
of forever undoing that which we did yesterday.' Justice Holmes, in
his eloquently parodoxical phraseology, valued predictability in the
law. In his 1897 address at the Boston University School of Law, he
spoke of law as nothing more than a body of "systematized predic-
tion" or "prophecies of the past."3 For him, the law could be under-
* Instructor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A. 1970, Wilkes College;
J.D. 1974, Cleveland State University College of Law; LL.M. 1978, University of Pennsylva-
nia School of Law. The text of this article was presented at the Annual Educational Confer-
ence of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in June 1984 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 269 (1980).
2. Eugen Ehrlich, a noted legal historian and scholar, spoke in terms of the "stability
of legal norms." See E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 132
(1936) (reprinted in 1962).
3. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in M.
LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 71, 72-73 (1943) [hereinafter referred to
as LERNER].
stood only from the point of view of "the bad man"4 who cares not
about axioms or deductions, but who wants to know what a court is
likely to do if he breaks the law. Thus, Holmes said, "[t]he prophe-
cies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law." 5
A. The Pennsylvania Experience: Predictability or Confusion?
For those court-watchers in Pennsylvania who place a premium
upon the goals of predictability and stability, the recent spate of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinions in the criminal area may have
engendered confusion or concern. Of approximately twenty-three
opinions rendered by the supreme court in a four-month period,' the
reversal rate was approximately sixty-five percent.7 Despite the in-
herent limitations of such informal and random statistics,' a "high"
reversal rate sparks a momentary pause for concern. It is too easy to
4. LERNER, supra note 3, at 74; but cf EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 440.
5. LERNER, supra note 3, at 75.
6. The opinions were filed in the last quarter of 1983. The lower court, in most of
these cases, was the Pennsylvania Superior Court, hereinafter refer 'ed to as superior court.
7. The reversal cases include Commonwealth v. Brown, 503 Pa. 514, 469 A.2d 1371
(1983); Commonwealth v. DiNicola, 503 Pa. 90, 468 A.2d 1078 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Dunbar, 503 Pa. 590, 470 A.2d 74 (1983); Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 503 Pa. 555, 470 A.2d
56 (1983); Commonwealth v. Macolino, 503 Pa. 201, 469 A.2d 132 (1983); Commonwealth v.
McCann, 503 Pa. 190, 469 A.2d 126 (1983); Commonwealth v. McGrath, - Pa. __, 470
A.2d 487 (1983); Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 470 A.2d 80 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Manley, 503 Pa. 482, 469 A.2d 1042 (1983); Commonwealth v. Parker, 503 Pa. 336,
469 A.2d 582 (1983); Commonwealth v. Reiss, 503 Pa. 45, 468 A.2d 451 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Sell, __ Pa. -, 470 A.2d 457 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 502 Pa.
573, 467 A.2d 819 (1983); Commonwealth v. Ohle, 503 Pa. 566, 470 A.2d 61 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Cooper, 503 Pa. 29, 467 A.2d 1301 (1983); Commonwealth v. Pollino, 503 Pa.
23, 467 A.2d 1298 (1983) Commonwealth v. Askin, 502 Pa. 575, 467 A.2d 820 (1983).
Affirmance cases include Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 469 A.2d 146 (1983);
Commonwealth v. Carson, 503 Pa. 369, 469 A.2d 599 (1983); Commonwealth v. Green, 503
Pa. 278, 469 A.2d 552 (1983); Commonwealth v. Fava, 503 Pa. 365, 469 A.2d 597 (1983);
Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 469 A.2d 137 (1983); Commonwealth v. Magwood,
503 Pa. 169, 469 A.2d 115 (1983); Commonwealth v. Romeri, - Pa . 470 A.2d 498
(1983); Commonwealth v. Scott, 503 Pa. 624, 470 A.2d 91 (1983).
Initially, however, we must place these statistics in a proper perspective. Many cases, for
example, approach the supreme court level on petition for further review and are denied sum-
marily without comment.
Appeals from the superior court to the supreme court, for example, undergo a process
known as a "petition for allowance of appeal," popularly referred to as "allocatur." See PA. R.
App. P. 1111-1123. PA. R. App. P. 1114 specifies that allowance of appeal is a matter of sound
judicial discretion and will be allowed only when there are "special and important reasons."
Such denials, therefore, silently represent constructive approval of the decision-making product
of the lower courts. Correlatively, those cases selected for further review - including those,
eventually reversed - represent a potentially "stacked deck." There is no adequate control
group to gauge the accuracy or productivity of the lower tiers of decision-making.
Only a small percentage of appeals from the superior court receives further review in the
supreme court. Between 1976-1980 there were from 3,631 to 4,523 appeals filed each year in
the superior court. In that same time period, allocatur petitions granted by the supreme court
ranged from 118 to 215 each year. Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Statistical
Report, Tables 7-8 (1976-1980).
8. For a discussion of the limited use of statistics, see Wier on behalf of Weir v.
Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 957 nn.2,3 (3d Cir. 1984).
fall prey to the glib conclusion that reversal-affirmance necessarily
represents right or wrong. As Justice Homes once observed,
I once heard a very eminent judge say that he never let a deci-
sion go until he was absolutely sure that it was right. So judicial
dissent often is blamed, as if it meant simply that one side or the
other were not doing their sums right, and, if they would take
more trouble, agreement inevitably would come.9
Yet in the adversarial process of American justice, complete
agreement is no more attainable among judges, lawyers and scholars
than it is among adversaries.1" In some cases, disagreement outside
the adversary forum can be even more bitter. A very good and public
illustration of caustic debate occurred in 1959-1960 in two issues of
the Harvard Law Review. A distinguished scholar, Professor Henry
M. Hart, Jr., severely criticized the United States Supreme Court
for the "absence of reason" in its opinions and the consequential
danger of the Court's undermining the professional respect of "first-
rate lawyers" for the Court. Of the forty pages devoted to Professor
Hart's analysis, the following is a typical example:
They lack the underpinning of principle which is necessary to
illumine large areas of the law and thus to discharge the func-
tion which has to be discharged by the highest judicial tribunal
of a nation dedicated to exemplifying the rule of law not only to
itself but to the whole world. Only opinions which are grounded
in reason and not on mere fiat or precedent can do the job which
the Supreme Court of the United States has to do. Only opin-
ions of this kind can be worked with by other men who have to
take a judgment rendered on one set of facts and decide how it
should be applied to a cognate but still different set of facts.
Only opinions of this kind can carry the weight which has to be
carried by the opinions of a tribunal which, after all, does not in
the end have the power either in theory or in practice to ram its
own personal preferences down other people's throats."
Such professional criticism, even when directed toward others, is
oftentimes not taken lightly. In like manner, but with a strong un-
dercurrent of sarcasm, Thurman Arnold was afforded approximately
twenty pages in a subsequent review to criticize Professor Hart's
9. LERNER, supra note 3, at 79-80.
10. See EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 241-42, in which Ehrlich states:
Among all of the ideas of justice that have been described until now there is not
one that has failed to encounter an antagonist in the course of historical develop-
ment who, in the deepest chest-tones of genuine conviction, would proclaim the
opposite as that which alone is just. This affords a deep insight into the nature of
justice.
Id.
11. Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959).
"tenents of procedural theology" and his characterization of opinions
as "judicial monstrosities." 2
Although the limitations of statistics and inevitability of criti-
cism may shed some light on the perilous pitfalls of decision-making,
the quest for principled decision-making, including predictability and
stability, must inevitably lead to further careful reflection and histor-
ical analysis. Are the reversals, from an intermediate appellate
court's perspective, for example, attributable to factors such as
changing conditions, the lessons of experiences, the perceived errors
of past decisions, or merely the vicissitudes of the judicial process? 3
Eugen Erhlich once observed that it is the "function of juristic sci-
ence, in the first place, to record the trends of justice that are found
in society, and to ascertain what they are, whence they come, and
whither they lead . . .",'
Justice Holmes, in a similar vein, noted that the primary signifi-
cance in every new effort of legal thought was to make the so-called
prophecies more precise and to generalize them into a thoroughly
connected system.'6 An economist's approach toward the problem of
principled appellate decision-making was expressed in the following
manner:
If appellate courts are to be part of a coherent legal system,
rather than arbiters armed with power to decide each case anew
in whatever way they choose, then what is decided in one case
must be part of a legal pattern applicable to other cases with
similar objective factors involved. What is decided in extreme
cases becomes a precedent for other cases. In this kind of social
package deal, often "hard cases make bad law" for the future.
• ..Appellate courts can adjust the application of their deci-
sions to some extent, but there are limits to how far this can go
and still retain the rule of law and the role of appellate courts as
rule-making organizations, rather than roving commissions with
sovereign powers to decide each case as they please. This is
neither a criticism nor a defense of appellate courts, but simply
an indication of the momentous legal trade-offs involved.'"
12. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1304-05 (1960).
13. These factors are identified and described in Israel, "Gideon v. Wainwright: The
'Art' of Overruling," 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 211, 215, 219-29 (Univ. of Chicago 1963).
14. EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 202.
15. LERNER, supra note 3, at 72.
16. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 273. Ehrlich noted that legal scientists could learn and
benefit from economists in that they both deal with different aspects of the same social phe-
nomena. See EHRLICH, supra note 2, at 503-04. Justice Holmes also once stated that the man
of the future is not the black letter man but the man of statistics and master of economics.
LERNER, supra note 3, at 83.
B. The Pennsylvania Experience: The Futile Attempt to
Reconcile?
The line-drawing involved in the so-called "adjustment'" in the
application of decisions versus "unprincipled" decision-making can
be treacherous. Principled decision-making, like predictability and
stability, are desirable goals not always achieved as fully as one
would like. To extract a principle of universality from a given case is
dangerous since the logic of the law is often superficial and often
rests primarily in its language rather than its substance. 17 The diffi-
culty in extracting universal precepts or reconciling similar cases
with different results can be illustrated by just two recent supreme
court cases, Commonwealth v. Ziegler 8 and Commonwealth v.
McGrath.5 9
Both cases were decided during the same term and addressed
the issues of suppression of inculpatory statements because of a fail-
ure to give the required Miranda20 warnings. Ziegler involved an in-
tensive post-shooting "debriefing" in which the defendant, a police
officer, was taken "through the ranks," in an effort to determine how
the fatal shooting occurred. The questioning of the officer, pursuant
to mandatory police department directives, lasted for approximately
five hours, during which time the officer himself was not permitted to
make any calls. During the course of the questioning, defendant Zie-
gler gave incriminatory statements. No Miranda warnings were
given. The lower court's order of suppression, affirmed by the supe-
rior court, 21 was reversed.
McGrath concerned the admissibility of statements taken from
a Marine private. The interview of the marine was in apparent re-
sponse to a charge of fraudulent enlistment, although, at the time of
the interview, Marine officers knew that there was an outstanding
warrant against McGrath for a pre-enlistment homicide. The private
was under constant supervision and taken through the rising com-
mand of his interrogators. No Miranda warnings or those required
by military regulations were given. Following his conviction of third
17. See LERNER, supra note 3, at 80. Consider, for example, the legal rules pertaining
to presumptions. Professor McCormick noted that the existence of a presumed fact flowing
from the establishment of a basic fact would not be possible if rules of logic were applied. The
advisory committee's note to Fed. R. Evid. 301 reinforces the sometimes cosmetic logic of the
law. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 807 (2d ed. 1972); and see Professor Edmund Morgan's
prefatory comments on presumptions in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVI-
DENCE 1, 52-53 (1942). Consider also the rationality of the fertile octogenarian rule in the law
of property. Professor Mellinkoff speaks of how the "immovable presumption of lifelong fecun-
dity" met the "irresistible Rule Against Perpetuities." D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW 443 (1963).
18. 503 Pa. 555, 470 A.2d 56 (1983).
19. --__ Pa. __, 470 A.2d 481 (1983).
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. 304 Pa. Super. 623, 450 A.2d 1055 (1982).
degree murder, the supreme court, on direct appeal, issued a plural-
ity opinion 22 and reversed because McGrath's statements had been
improperly admitted at his trial.
The factual scenarios are simplistically described for the mo-
ment because the interesting aspect of the two cases is their differ-
ences in approach and tone toward a similar legal issue. In regard to
the setting or context, the interview in Officer Ziegler's case is de-
scribed nonperjoratively as a "debriefing," viewed as a mere routine,
administrative matter between the employer and his employee; in
Private McGrath's case, the plurality stresses, with perjorative em-
phasis, the "rising chain of command," the "interview" and "the re-
alities of the military situation. '2 3 Likewise, the different values
placed on Miranda are significant. In Officer Ziegler's case, the
court interprets Miranda narrowly as protecting the accused from
incommunicado interrogation and coercive police tactics.2 4 Such a
view, incidentally, probably comports with the recent views of the
United States Supreme Court.25 On the other hand, the court in Pri-
vate McGrath's case disavows a myopic focus2" of Miranda and
stresses not only the significance of a deprivation of physical freedom
but, unlike Ziegler, also emphasizes the suspect's reasonable belief
about what is happening to him. McGrath takes a "totality of cir-
cumstances" and, essentially, a "common sense" approach to support
its order of inadmissibility notwithstanding Justice McDermott's ob-
servation that the result was "directly contradictory" with that
reached in Ziegler.
In both cases, the principle in issue was simple: one who is sub-
ject to "custodial interrogation" is entitled to receive beforehand his
constitutional Miranda warnings as a predicate to the later admissi-
bility of any statements. Yet in both cases, the analyses and results
vary.
C. The Dialectics and Methodology of History - The Myth and
the Pendulum?
The Ziegler and McGrath cases illustrate the difficulty in pur-
suing predictability and universality in the law.27 The dismaying ex-
22. Two justices dissented and two justices concurred in the result. The dispute gener-
ated by the plurality opinion concerns the application of Miranda, under a totality of circum-
stances approach, where the questioner's status is not strictly one of law enforcement.
23. McGrath, __ Pa. at __, 470 A.2d at 493.
24. See Ziegler, 503 Pa. at 561, 470 A.2d at 58-59.
25. Custodical arrest was interpreted very narrowly in Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S.
Ct. 1136 (1984).
26. McGrath, - Pa. at -, 470 A.2d at 492.
27. See S. HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT (Harv. Univ. Press 1983), wherein
the author questions the role of logic and universality in the identification and application of
standards of conduct.
perience, to some at least, is the inevitable futility that one en-
counters in maintaining the belief that all law can be reasoned from
a color-matching analysis of our "prophecies of the past." Neverthe-
less, the development of the law does contain some lessons for the
present. "The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study
of history."128 Sometimes trends and patterns may be evident that, in
hindsight, either contribute to the stability of the content of the law
or pour new content in order to give law a new meaning. The follow-
ing discussion addresses a very small span of criminal jurisprudence
in Pennsylvania. The purpose is to appreciate that past law and per-
haps understand the present.
II. Per se Rules: Automatic Justice
In the years between 1972 and 1977, revolutionary changes oc-
curred in the criminal justice system in Pennsylvania. These
changes, moreover, were all potentially beneficial to defendants. Six
important areas were affected: speedy trial, jury trial waivers, guilty
plea colloquies, custodial interrogation of juveniles, prompt arraign-
ment of the accused, and insanity defenses. In each area, rigid per se
prophylactic rules29 were created or, as will be seen, such rules incre-
28. LERNER, supra note 3, at 83.
29. Oftentimes one will find the terms "prophylactic" and "per se" indiscriminately
used without any specific definitional import. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa.
511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984). Many of the cases cited herein use such terms without distinction.
Other courts have used the terms in various contexts. See, e.g., Bradford v. Gardner, 578 F.
Supp. 382 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (whether crowded sleeping quarters in jail are per se unconstitu-
tional); Abdul-Karim v. First Fed. S & L Ass'n, 101 II.2d 400, 462 N.E.2d 488 (1984) (due-
on-sale provision in mortgage is valid per se); Davidoff by Davidoff v. Metro Baseball Club,
Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 996, 1000-01, 475 N.Y.S. 2d 367, 368 (1984) (Cooke, C.J., dissenting) (per
se rule governing duty of care owed by proprietor of baseball field considered).
The term "per se" has been defined as meaning "by itself" and referring to "in its own
nature without reference to its relations." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (5th ed. 1979).
The term "prophylactic" has been described as tending to prevent or ward off, preventive,
cautionary. See WEBSTER'S 3RD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1818 (1976).
In the context of this paper, the terms, although used interchangeably, have potentially
distinct meanings and functions. Per se, for example, may be considered in two different re-
spects. Per se may refer to the rigid application of a rule irrespective of attending circum-
stances. Consider the rules requiring an intelligent and informed adult's consultation with a
charged minor or the specification of particular areas of inquiry before accepting a defendant's
guilty plea or jury trial waiver. Collateral facts or circumstances are not considered in deciding
whether the rule must be implemented. On the other hand, per se is a term that can also refer
to the remedy itself when the inflexible rule is violated. In Rule 1100 cases, the per se remedy,
irrespective of costs or other considerations, is discharge; in most other cases, the remedy is a
new trial or suppression of evidence. The per se rule represents, in a sense, an "If A, then B"
type of logic with respect to both application and remedy.
"Prophylactic," likewise, is a term that can turn inward upon itself or outward toward the
situation and its consequences. First, the term may relate to the purpose of the promulgated
rule. Most per se rules have been designed to avoid unnecessary and inexcusable violations of a
defendant's rights; and such rules have been justified for their facilitating administrative con-
venience and uniformity in the application of law. In Rule 1100 cases, for example, the objects
of prevention are excessive backlogs, violation of a defendant's speedy trial right, administra-
tive difficulties and inequitable application of the potentially expansive "speedy trial" term. On
the other hand, the term can look beyond the requirements of the rule and toward the remedy.
mentally insinuated themselves into the criminal justice system. The
prevailing sentiments in these cases were essentially the (1) protec-
tion of the rights of the accused, (2) administrative convenience and
uniformity in the application of the law, and (3) prevention of future
abuse through the imposition of costly remedies such as discharge,
exclusion of evidence, or grant of a new trial.
A. Rule 1100
In 1972, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice (now
Chief Justice) Nix, the groundwork for the controversial Rule 11000
If the remedy is harsh enough, law enforcement and courts may respond to the letter of the
rule with more intelligence, understanding and perhaps sensitivity. Thus, the prophylactic con-
tent of a per se rule, in a remedial sense, may represent an inherent costly incentive to moti-
vate others to avoid, for example, the suppression of evidence, the grant of a new trial or the
discharge of a defendant. Purpose and remedy are thus important to a rule with a prophylactic
thrust.
Such malleable terms, of course, are not limited to use by lawyers and courts. F. Scott
Fitzgerald apparently once wrote a song ("Love or Eugenics") in 1914 for the Princeton Tri-
angle Show. The song stated in part: "Men, which would you like to come and pour your tea,/
Kisses that set your heart aflame,/Or love from a prophylactic dame." See D. Kevles, Annals
of Eugenics - A Secular Faith, THE NEW YORKER 52 (October 15, 1984).
30. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100 [hereinafter referred to as Rule 1100]. The Rule is not appli-
cable to cases initiated prior to June 30, 1973. See Commonwealth v. Tolassi, 489 Pa. 41, 413
A.2d 1003 (1980). The Rule applied a 270 day period to complaints filed between June 30,
1973 and July 1, 1974.
Pennsylvania's present speedy trial rule states:
Rule 1100. Prompt Trial
(a)(1) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the
defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no later
than two hundred seventy (270) days from the date on which the complaint is
filed.
(2) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the
defendant after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
(3) Trial in a court case which is transferred from the juvenile court to the
trial or criminal division shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180)
days from the date of filing the transfer order.
(b) For the purpose of this Rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the
date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere.
(c)(1) At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement
of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order
extending the time for commencement of trial.
(2) A copy of such motion shall be served upon the defendant through his
attorney, if any, and the defendant shall also have the right to be heard thereon.
(3) Such motion shall set forth facts in support thereof, and shall be
granted only upon findings based upon a record showing that trial cannot be
commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Common-
wealth and, if the delay is due to the court's inability to try the defendant within
the prescribed period, upon findings based upon a record showing the causes of
the delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.
(4) Any order granting a motion for extension shall specify the date or pe-
riod within which trial shall be commenced. Trial shall be scheduled for the
earliest date or period consistent with the extension request and the court's busi-
ness, and the record shall so indicate.
(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be
excluded therefrom:
was established. Commonwealth v. Hamilton31 was an appeal by the
Commonwealth involving an admittedly egregious delay of six years
in the defendant's trial. The defendant claimed that, as a result, he
was severely prejudiced in his ability to secure testimony. At the
time, speedy trial rules existed in some form in approximately thirty-
three states."2 Of these states, twenty imposed the bar of subsequent
prosecution for violation of such rules. The court in Hamilton per-
ceived the need to establish a mandatory 180-day-trial-or-discharge
rule in order to rectify the severe case backlog problems in Pennsyl-
vania. At the same time, the court felt that such a rule would protect
the liberty and constitutional speedy trial interests33 of defendants.
Justice Nix identified those preponderating interests as follows:
vagueness and subjectivity inherent in a general speedy trial concept
would be eliminated; a case-by-case analysis, administratively costly,
would be avoided; and courts would be "stimulated" by the new rule
to reduce their backlogs.3" For Hamilton, a man charged with mur-
der, a proposed rule of procedure and enunciation of policy resulted
in his discharge.
(1) the period of time between the filing of the written complaint and the
defendant's arrest; provided that the defendant could not be apprehended be-
cause his whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due
diligence;
(2) any period of time for which the defendant expressly waives Rule 1100;
(3) such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(i) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney;
(ii) any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his
attorney.
(e)(l) When a trial court has granted a new trial and no appeal has been
perfected, the new trial shall commence within one hundred and twenty (120)
days after the date of the order granting a new trial.
(2) When an appellate court has granted a new trial, or has affirmed an
order of a trial court granting a new trial, the new trial shall commence within
one hundred and twenty (120) days after the appellate court remands the record
to the trial court. The date of remand shall be the date as it appears in the
appellate court docket.
(f) At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the
court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this
Rule has been violated. A copy of such motion shall be served upon the attorney
for the Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon. Any
order granting such motion shall dismiss the charges with prejudice and dis-
charge the defendant.
(g) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to modify any time limit con-
tained in any statute of limitations.
31. 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972).
32. Id. at 308, n.10, 297 A.2d at 132, n.10. See also Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in
Application, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 611 (1980); Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1957).
33. See infra note 77. The federal right is not limited by specific temporal considera-
tions. Factors relevant to a speedy trial violation assessment under federal law include the
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to the defendant and the defen-
dant's assertion of his rights. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
34. 449 Pa. at 306-09, 297 A.2d at 132-33. But see infra note 77.
B. Jury Trial Waiver
In 1973, the court was given the opportunity to address a funda-
mental concept - the right of a defendant to a jury trial. 35 The
right itself, of course, was not in question; rather, the issue was the
extent of a defendant's understanding of that right before a valid
waiver could be effectuated. Through Justice Nix, with one concur-
rence and one dissent, the court ordered a new trial in Common-
wealth v. Williams36 because there was no on-the-record explanation
to the defendant of the right that he relinquished in a signed, written
waiver. The Williams court reasoned: "Nowhere on the record is
there any indication that he knew the essential ingredients of a jury
trial which are necessary to understand the significance of the right
he was waiving.13 7  In its references to Commonwealth v.
Fugmann,8 the court obviously believed that it was implementing an
essential right guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution.3 9 Al-
though interestingly the jury trial waiver issue was asserted in an
ineffectiveness context, the noteworthy aspect of Williams is its ex-
plicit renunciation of the need for any prophylactic rule for noncom-
pliance with the then existing Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 1 101. Facially then, Williams was not a per se case.
Nevertheless, five years later, some post hoc rationalization both
revealed and supported the inflexibility of Williams. In Common-
wealth v. Morin,4" another ineffectiveness case with two dissents,4 '
Justice Manderino rejected the Commonwealth's argument that a
remedy for a defective colloquy, that is, on-the-record omission of
one of more of the "essential ingredients," was a remand for an evi-
dentiary hearing rather than a new trial. Asserting the need to pro-
tect a defendant's constitutional rights and promote more effective
appellate review of jury trial waiver issues, the majority ordered a
new trial.
Shortly thereafter, in Justice Pomeroy's dissent in Common-
wealth v. Greene,4' the nonprophylactic basis for Williams was ar-
gued. Justice Pomeroy, speaking for himself and two other justices,
recognized, however, that perhaps Morin transformed Williams into
35. The right to a jury trial in criminal cases is guaranteed in the federal and st2te
constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; PA. CONST., art. 1, §§ 6, 9.
36. 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973).
37. Id. at 373, 312 A.2d at 600 (emphasis added). The essential ingredients of a jury
trial were deemed to include a jury of one's peers, unanimity of verdict and defendant's partic-
ipation in the selection of the jury.
38. 330 Pa. 4, 198 A. 99 (1938).
39. See supra note 35.
40. 477 Pa. 80, 383 A.2d 832 (1978).
41. Six justices participated in the decision of the case.
42. 483 Pa. 195, 394 A.2d 978 (1978).
an inflexible rule.43 The six-man majority in Greene issued a per
curiam opinion in support of its new trial order because the defen-
dant was not properly advised of the unanimity aspect of his right to
a jury trial. Thus, the inflexibility of the jury trial waiver rule had its
genesis in Williams and its full development in Morin and Greene.
C. Guilty Plea Colloquy
The rigid rules initially established for jury trial waivers serve
as an interesting parallel to the guilty plea colloquy rule. In 1974,
the supreme court enunciated the so-called Ingram standard."" One
can read Ingram repeatedly and still question whether Ingram's in-
tent was presumably, like that of Williams, to establish a set of in-
flexible requirements. Was Ingram's purpose, recognizably stated in
the context of a simplistic colloquy, to require the lower courts to
assure that defendants understood the charges to which they were
pleading guilty; or did the "minimum areas of inquiry," suggested in
the comments to Rule 319 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure,46 establish a prophylactic basis for the rule?
A crucial passage of Ingram stated that the defendant "was en-
titled to an explanation of the elements of the crime of murder with
an illustrative elucidation of the term 'malice.' "46 In another portion
43. Morin and Greene, not Williams, established the per se character of the jury trial
waiver rule.
44. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974). Justice Pomeroy con-
curred in the result. There were no dissents.
45. At the time Ingram was decided, PA. R. CRIM. P. 319(a) provided:
(a) Generally. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of
the court, nolo contendere. The judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and
shall not accept it unless he determines after inquiry of the defendant that the
plea is voluntarily and understandably tendered. Such inquiry shall appear on
the record.
The court in Ingram stated:
The comments recommend that at a minimum the judge asks questions to
elicit the following information:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he is
pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has the right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent until he is
found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or
fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any
plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such agreement?
455 Pa. at 204-05 n.5, 316 A.2d at 81 n.5 (emphasis added). The court in Ingram was con-
-cerned primarily with items (1) and (2). The court found a sufficient factual basis from the
defendant's admission that he shot and killed the victim. There was, however, no satisfaction
of item (2) since the lower court's comments to the defendant about shooting and killing were
not tantamount to warning the defendant of the legal explanation of murder. The distinctive
character and importance of the elements component, moreover, was emphasized in note 4 of
Ingram.
46. 455 Pa. at 204, 316 A.2d at 80 (emphasis added).
of the opinion, however, the court simply said that the elements of
the crime must be outlined in understandable terms.47 Such a state-
ment is not equivalent to establishing an element-of-the-crime re-
quirement. Yet it would seem that Ingram required both a recitation
and an explanation of the elements. A mandatory, prophylactic view-
point is buttressed by the court's explanation that its new pronounce-
ment and implementation of the rule would facilitate appellate re-
view; in addition, of course, it would protect the defendant.
Nevertheless, it was in Commonwealth v. Minor48 that the supreme
court, citing with approval a Harvard Law Review" article, stated
that a defendant's understanding must be based on an on-the-record
explanation to him of the nature and elements of the crime charged.
The implementation and enforcement of the new rule necessi-
tated new trials in both Ingram and Minor.50 The costs of the In-
gram rule were not assessed. The overriding values were protection
of the defendant's rights51 and the simplification of the appellate re-
view process.
D. Interested-Adult Rule
There have been other occasions when our courts have preferred
to slide, rather than jump, into prophylactic rule-making. The inter-
ested-adult rule,52 often referred to as the "McCutchen rule," is an
example.
Commonwealth v. McCutchen5 s has been viewed as having es-
tablished a per se rule that no person under the age of eighteen years
47. Id. at 204, 316 A.2d at 80.
48. 467 Pa. 230, 356 A.2d 346 (1976), overruled, Commonwealth v. Minarik, 493 Pa.
573, 487 A.2d 623 (1981). Two justices dissented in Minor. Justice Pomeroy stated that In-
gram was not required by federal or state law.
49. See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 184 (1969).
50. Minor made clear that the remedy for a defective colloquy was a reversal of the
"tainted conviction." Minor, 467 Pa. at 235 n.4, 356 A.2d at 348 n.4.
51. The Supreme Court in 1969 noted that a guilty plea involved a waiver of important
constitutional rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury
and the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (no on-
the-record supporting colloquy). See also infra note 107.
52. The term is only partially accurate. The rule is actually the interested and in-
formed adult rule. The cornerstone of the rule is believed to be the inexperience of youth. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, which states:
The new rule appreciates that the inexperience of the minor affects not only his
or her ability to understand the full implication and consequences of the predica-
ment but also renders the judgment inadequate to assess the spectrum of consid-
erations encompassed in the waiver decision. It was therefore reasoned that the
impediment of immaturity can only be overcome where the record establishes
that the youth had access to the advice of an attorney, parent, or other interested
adult and that the consulted adult was informed as to the constitutional rights
available to the minor and aware of the consequences that might follow the elec-
tion to be made.
472 Pa. 492, 498-99, 372 A.2d 797, 800 (1977) (footnotes and citations omitted).
53. 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
could effectively waive his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to have the assistance of counsel, without first being accorded an
opportunity to consult with an informed adult who is interested in
that juvenile's rights. McCutchen, as well as the two prior cases upon
which it relied, Commonwealth v. Roane54 and Commonwealth v.
Starkes,55 were plurality opinions. Although they did not have prece-
dential significance, 56 they were influential in laying the groundwork
and in articulating the motivating concerns for a new per se rule.
57
Again, the concerns centered on the rights of the defendant - the
right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination. 58 And
again, the price of noncompliance was significant and unassessed,
namely, a new trial and the exclusion of evidence without regard to
the factual context (for example, age, intelligence, prior criminal ex-
perience of defendant, nature and extent of prior consultations) of
the case.
The McCutchen rule established a foothold in our jurisprudence
in Commonwealth v. Riggs, 59 a per curiam opinion with two dis-
sents. Justice Nix's concurrence is especially noteworthy. Justice
Nix, with prescience that may not have been appreciated at the time,
stated simply that the governing analysis had been confused. In his
view, the proper test was a totality-of-the-circumstances test which,
he said, had in fact been applied in McCutchen. Notwithstanding
this observation, the interested-adult rule became known as the Mc-
Cutchen rule and was thereafter applied inflexibly.
E. Prearraignment Delay
In 1977, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court boldly articulated a
per se rule of exclusion for cases of prearraignment delay. The semi-
nal case was Commonwealth v. Davenport, ° in which a unanimous
court, through Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberts, formulated the
following sweeping rule: If an accused is not arraigned within six
hours of arrest, any statement obtained after arrest, but before ar-
raignment, shall not be admissible at trial.6'
54. 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974).
55. 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975). The prior rule, it should be noted, was governed
by a totality-of-circumstances test. See Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131
(1971).
56. Plurality opinions do not have automatic precedential authority. See Common-
wealth v. Davenport, 462 Pa. 543, 342 A.2d 67 (1975); Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375,
378 A.2d 841 (1977).
57. The dissent in Roane, in fact, considered the prophylactic rule as having estab-
lished a foothold.
58. See Roane, 459 Pa. at 393-94, 329 A.2d at 288; Starkes, 461 Pa. at 182 n.3, 335
A.2d at 700 n.3.
59. 465 Pa. 208, 348 A.2d 429 (1975).
60. 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977). C.J. Jones did not participate.
61. The precursor to Davenport was Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d
The underlying rationales of this rule were to protect the ac-
cused's right to know the nature and cause of the accusations against
him and to protect him from unreasonable seizures. 2 The functional
justifications were familiar: simplifying the task of determining ad-
missibility by furthering judicial economy and eliminating the need
for pretrial litigation; promoting more even-handed application of
criminal procedural rules; giving guidance to the trial courts, bar
and police; and deterring violations of rules designed to protect the
rights of the accused. The rule appeared broad, clear and admitting
of no exceptions. Except one. At note seven of the opinion, however,
the court, through Justice Nix, noted that six hours should be a
workable standard readily complied with "in the absence of exigent
circumstances. '6 3 This tucked-away phrase later served as an inter-
pretative vehicle for undermining the rule's facial inflexibility and
minimizing its costs.
As with pivotal trend-setting cases, the facts or context attend-
ing a new rule should not be ignored. In Mr. Davenport's case, he
was charged with murder. The delay between arrest and arraign-
ment, amounting to 19 /2 hours, was clearly attributable to police
investigation and interrogation. Thus, the evil sought to be avoided
was extended and avoidable prearraignment delay designed to obtain
incriminating statements.
F. Insanity Instructions
Last, in 1977, the supreme court addressed the issue of jury in-
structions in murder cases where the defendant raises insanity as a
defense. Must a jury be informed of the commitment consequences
of returning a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity? Since the
1936 decision in Commonwealth v. Gables,64 Pennsylvania courts
had answered this question in the negative.
When Mr. Mulgrew was denied his proferred request on the
issue, however, the supreme court seized the opportunity to reexam-
ine Gable. Upon further reflection, the Mulgrew" court overruled
Gable and issued the following rule: When insanity is raised as a
possible defense to criminal charges, a jury must be instructed con-
417 (1972), which established an evidential exclusionary rule for statements related to unnec-
essary delay. A three-part balancing test for determining suppression was thereafter an-
nounced in Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974). The exclusionary
and Davenport rules were intended to implement the protections and requirements of PA. R.
CRIM. P. 122, 130 and 140 concerning prompt arraignments.
62. Davenport cited U.S. CONST. amends. IV, VI and X1V; and PA. CONST., art. 1, §§
8, 9 and 14.
63. 471 Pa. at 286-87 n.7, 370 A.2d at 306 n.7.
64. 323 Pa. 449, 187 A. 393 (1936).
65. Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977). Six justices partic-
ipated. There were no dissents.
cerning the possible psychiatric treatment and commitment of the
defendant after the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity.6" Fundamental to the creation of this rule was the belief
that such an instruction assists the jury in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant and, in the process, reduces the possibil-
ity of a compromise verdict.
Of the prophylactic rules examined thus far, Mulgrew was
viewed as having a direct bearing on the determination of guilt or
innocence. But how "mandatory," assuming that there are calibra-
tions of such a term, was the rule? In 1982, a panel majority of the
superior court, including the lower court judge who had presided
over Mulgrew's initial trial, suggested in an ineffectiveness context
that Mulgrew established a per se rule even if such an instruction
were not requested. 7 As the panel majority noted, "To hold other-
wise would render ineffectual the statement in Mulgrew that such
instruction 'assist[s] the jury in properly determining the guilt or in-
nocence of a defendant . . . [and] reduce[s] the possibility of com-
promise verdicts of guilty occasioned by a jury's misapprehension of
'acquitting' a defendant by reason of insanity.' "68 Later the panel
observed, "It is noteworthy that Mulgrew created no exceptions to
its holding."6 9 Such a conclusion, however, proved to be wrong.
III. Per Se Rules: Do Bad Rules Make Bad Law?
Change is not necessarily synonymous with revolution. Yet in-
cremental alterations or adjustments over a span of time may indeed
facilitate a recursive process to the point of elimination or total
transformation. Essentially, such changes are evolutionary. But
revolution is a term denoting sudden, dramatic and fundamental re-
structuring of a situation or condition. 0 The creation of per se, pro-
phylactic and exclusionary rules during the 1972 to 1977 period rep-
resented a revolutionary modification of a small part of the criminal
justice process. That revolution, however, has been met with a coun-
terrevolution whereby dogmatic rules, once considered essential to
the protections of individuals and the administration of justice, have
given way to an almost opaque balancing process of decision-
making.71
66. Id. at 277-78, 380 A.2d at 352.
67. See Commonwealth v. McCann, 302 Pa. Super. 442, 448 A.2d 1123 (1982), rev'd,
503 Pa. 190, 469 A.2d 126 (1983).
68. 302 Pa. Super. at 449, 448 A.2d at 1127.
69. Id. at 451, 448 A.2d at 1128.
70. "Revolution" has been defined as a sudden, radical or complete change; also as an
activity or movement designed to effect fundamental changes in the socioeconomic situation.
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 984 (1981).
71. The judicial aversion to such hard-and-fast per se rules is not unusual. Justice Lar-
sen, for example, expressed his disapproval of the per se rule of Commonwealth v. Lee, 262
An examination of cases in the selected prophylactic law cate-
gory indicates that there is a new vision in the criminal justice sys-
tem animating the creators toward a new order. As a result, a
profound reorientation of interests is occurring at an accelerated
pace. From Rule 1100 to the Mulgrew issue, fundamental reversals
of policy and practice have been witnessed. Whether these reversals
are attributable to a transformation of the composition of the su-
preme court72 or to an enlightened evolution in legal thinking is not
clear. It is difficult to determine whether the supreme court's current
thinking is philosophically or economically oriented. Do the members
of the court believe that somehow the criminal justice system in
Pennsylvania has strayed from the concepts of "justice;" or do they
simply view the creation of per se rules as having reached the point
of diminishing returns, as in Rule 1100 cases, where litigation has
burgeoned without regard to the fundamental concerns of guilt or
innocence?
Notwithstanding the impossibility of identifying the cause of the
court's current thinking, one can decipher a logic or unifying vision
which has been responsible, to some degree, for the disturbance in
the six prophylactic law areas mentioned. The common denominator
in these different, but interconnected areas, is a new vision of the
concept of justice and the legal process resting on the following con-
cerns: (1) recognition of the public's interest in the determination of
guilt; (2) the need for flexibility and a "common sense" approach in
the administration of justice and reduction of those rules which en-
cumber the exercise of judicial power; 73 (3) the need to increase
those tools of inquiry viewed as essential to a determination of truth,
guilt and innocence; and (4) the elimination of costly procedures and
"legalities" (i.e., new trials, suppression) which enable defendants to
exploit and play gamesmanship with the criminal justice system.
These repetitive concerns, as we shall see, have pervaded the law
from Rule 1100 to Mulgrew and have spilled over into other areas of
the law. In every case, however, the retrenchment has disadvantaged
the particular defendant.
Pa. Super. 280, 396 A.2d 755 (1978), requiring the testimony of an identifying witness at a
pretrial suppression hearing at the risk of automatic suppression. See Commonwealth v. Nel-
son, 488 Pa. 148, 160 n.7, 411 A.2d 740, 746 n.7 (1980) (opinion in support of reversal). Lee
was later overruled in Commonwealth v. Thompkins, 311 Pa. Super. 357, 457 A.2d 925
(1983).
72. Consider, for example, the transitions since 1977. In 1977, the supreme court was
composed of Chief Justice Jones and Justices Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and
Manderino; in 1980, Chief Justice Eagen and Justices O'Brien, Roberts, Nix,Larsen, Flaherty
and Kauffman; and in 1984, Chief Justice Nix and Justices Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott,
Hutchinson, Zappala and Papadakos. Chief Justice Roberts' tenure ended in 1983.
73. See, e.g., infra note 226.
A. Rule 1100
The advantage of twelve years experience with Rule 1100, as
first enunciated in the unanimous opinion of Commonwealth v.
Hamilton,7" and the caselaw spawned by the Rule, have served to
check the initial enthusiasm (at least in some circles) with which the
Rule was greeted. 75 There is presently a sentiment that Rule 1100
has somehow gotten out of hand. Fortifying this viewpoint is the dis-
like of rules which, for some, represents nothing more than auto-
matic or "push-button justice".
The Hamilton court inaugurated the new Rule out of a concern
that the tremendous backlog of cases enabled defendants to "manip-
ulate" the system through negotiation. Despite this laudatory and
valid concern, manipulation continued to infiltrate the courtrooms.
In a significant recent case, Commonwealth v. Crowley, Justice
Hutchinson identified the philosophical viewpoint of the court in
Rule 1100 matters as follows:
The standards of Rule 1100 have reduced the need for defen-
dants to revert to the somewhat ambiguous constitutional right
to a speedy trial. However, it has prompted much litigation over
the precise meaning of its terms. It is indeed ironic that such a
substantial amount of judicial resources must now be devoted to
the myriad of hearings on petitions for extensions of time and
motions to dismiss filed under the rule thus further clogging al-
ready overcrowded dockets. 6
It is questionable whether the disenchantment with Rule 1 100
will lead to an eventual explicit scrapping of the written Rule and
whether such a response would in any way alleviate the litigational
costs experienced in speedy trial determinations.77 Such concerns, in
74. See supra note 31.
75. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Prompt Trial Rule: Is the Remedy Worse than
the Disease?, 81 DICK. L. REV. 237 n.7 (1977), which points out that prior to Klopfer, the
Pennsylvania constitution was construed as providing less relief than the sixth amendment
guarantee. See also Marshall & Reiter, A Trial Court Working with Rule 1100, 23 VILL. L.
REV. 284 (1977); cf. Comment, Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial: The Element of
Prejudice and the Burden of Proof, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 310 (1971).
It is interesting to note the burgeoning of annotations on the speedy trial rule in Pennsyl-
vania. In the 1978 pamphlet to the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Purdon's Pennsylvania Stat-
utes Annotated), the Rule spanned pages 244-66. In the similar pamphlet for 1984 (Purdon's
Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated), the Rule covered pages 450-540.
76. Commonwealth v. Crowley, 502 Pa. 393, 399 n.5, 466 A.2d 1009, 1012 n.5 (1983);
and compare note 8 therein.
77. A speedy trial is a right guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. See U.S.
CONST., amend. VI; PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9. See also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Rule 1100 is not constitutional in content. Justice Nix remarked in Commonwealth v.
Johnson 487 Pa. 197, 409 A.2d 308 (1979), that Rule 1100 is an administrative method
designed to give substance to the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. Accord, Common-
wealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65, 425 A.2d 367 (1981). Where a constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated, the defendant is entitled to a discharge. See Strunk v. U.S., 412
fact, prompted strong dissents in Crowley, and in Commonwealth v.
Manley.78 When the majority in Crowley reversed the superior
court's order of discharge,79 which was based on judicial delay that
caused a twenty-two-day violation of the Rule, the dissent argued
that the majority's view of inevitable judicial delay totally emascu-
lated the purposes of the Rule. The dissent charged that the majority
was indulging in a "charade of judicial gymnastics." 80 Again, in
Manley, a case concerning another reversal of the superior court's
order of discharge, the two dissenters voiced their concern that the
court was on a path of abandoning one of its own rules of court.8 '
What separates the majority from the minority in these and
other cases is the justices' philosophical difference regarding Rule
1100's purpose in the criminal justice system and its function in soci-
ety. The new majority position has effectuated a redefinition of Rule
1100; in some cases, it is definition by exclusion. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Dunbar,8' the majority, in reversing the superior
court's order,8" noted that the purpose of Rule 1100 was "not
designed to insulate the guilty" or eliminate the disadvantage to the
Commonwealth by protracted delays. The Dunbar majority, in justi-
fying defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss on a "then prevail-
ing practice" rationale, expressed its clear dislike for defendants who
try to exploit the Rule with tactical delays. As the majority stated,
"This court will not allow the gamesmanship of a concededly guilty
defendant to govern the conduct of criminal proceedings, nor will it
permit a defendant, by virtue of such gamesmanship, to flaunt his
guilt in the face of the judicial system, the Commonwealth, and the
citizens of Pennsylvania. '"84
The Rule 1100 balancing process now takes into account the
conceded guilt of the defendant, his gamesmanship, as well as the
interests of society and the justice system. These interests were
forcefully expressed in Crowley where the majority paradoxically
justified judicial delay by a common sense recognition of a fact of
U.S. 434 (1973).
As to the efficacy of rules implementing the constitutional right, see Bridges, The Speedy
Trial Act of 1974: Effects on Delays in Federal Criminal Litigation, 73 J. CR.L. & CRIM. 50-
73 (1982). The author noted that there was little reduction in case processing time and that
compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (Supp. IV 1974) stemmed primarily from the frequent use
of the Act's exclusion provisions. See also infra note 89.
78. 503 Pa. 482, 469 A.2d 1042 (1983).
79. 281 Pa. Super. 26, 421 A.2d 1129 (1980).
80. 502 Pa. 393, 408, 466 A.2d 1009, 1017. In Commonwealth v. Genovese, Justice
Nix began his dissent with the charge that the majority sought to justify its undermining and
manipulation of the Rule for the purported sake of society's interests.
81. 503 Pa. at 486, 469 A.2d at 1045.
82. 503 Pa. 590, 470 A.2d 74 (1983).
83. 301 Pa. Super. 223, 447 A.2d 622 (1982), per curiam, reargument denied (1982).
84. 503 Pa. at 600, 470 A.2d at 79 (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 497 Pa. 7, 12, 438
A.2d 592, 595 (1981)).
legal life which generated the Rule - crowded trial dockets. In dis-
avowing an inflexible, mechanical application of Rule 1100, the
Crowley majority, prior to citing a law review article, articulated the
view that the "criminal justice system owes society the duty not to
abort trials. '8 5 The court spoke of the important public interest in
the determination of guilt process and the severe costs (discharge)
imposed on society for violations of the Rule. Further, the court
proclaimed:
Rule 1100 was designed to promote the administration of crimi-
nal justice within the context of our entire judicial system, not to
render that system hostage to its own closed logic. The goals of
efficiency and ease of administration which Rule 1100 serves are
worthy; they should not be exalted at the expense of justice.
Thus, in interpreting our Rule 1100, we must throw away the
stopwatch and pick up the scales of justice.86
Thus, the prophylactic application of Rule 1100 to reduce the courts'
criminal backlogs either is no longer the predominant concern or is
subservient to the concern for "justice". Where the application of
Rule 1100 corresponds with such jurisprudential concerns, the su-
preme court arguably would affirm. In Commonwealth v. Green,87
for example, the court affirmed the superior court's decision that the
three-and-one-half year delay did not result in a violation of Rule
1100 because under pre-Coleman88 standards, the defendant had vol-
85. 502 Pa. 393, 399, 466 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1983) (emphasis added). One should not
forget, however, that the supreme court had previously stated that the Commonwealth also has
an affirmative duty to move its cases to trial. See Commonwealth v. Cooley, 484 Pa. 14, 398
A.2d 637 (1979) (a pre-Rule 1100 case). See also Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 292 Pa. Super.
100, 436 A.2d 1024 (1981).
Almost two years before Crowley, the court emphasized society's interest in the Rule
1100 equation. The shift was away from the Commonwealth's affirmative obligation and the
Rule's specific requirements and toward a general multifactoral definition by description of the
Rule. In reversing, Justice Kauffman stated:
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth
in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule
1100 must be construed in a manner consistent with society's right to punish and
deter crime. In considering matters such as that now before us, courts must
carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the indi-
vidual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law en-
forcement as well. Strained and illogical judicial construction adds nothing to
our search for justice, but only serves to expand the already bloated arsenal of
the unscrupulous criminal determined to manipulate the system. Neither the
language nor the spirit of Rule 1100 is inconsistent with the logical, common
sense conclusion that the 180 days must run from the filing of the second com-
plaint, the one which commenced this prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65, 72-73, 425 A.2d 367, 371 (1981) (emphasis added).
86. 502 Pa. at 402, 466 A.2d at 1014. The severe cost of discharge was attacked by
Professor Amsterdam in Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 525 (1975). Professor Amsterdam stated that only in exceptional circumstances
should discharge-with-prejudice occur.
87. 503 Pa. 278, 469 A.2d 552 (1983).
88. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 477 Pa. 400, 383 A.2d 1268 (1978) (plurality opinion
untarily and intelligently effectuated an indefinite waiver.
On the other hand, Rule 1100 discharge decisions that rest
predominantly on the dual orthodox justification of protecting a de-
fendant's speedy trial rights and reducing the system's backlog will
come under careful appellate scrutiny. The dissenters in the recent
spate of Rule 1100 cases relied on the orthodox viewpoint and, obvi-
ously, have not been successful. Contrary to the dissenters' urging
that "objective" standards must be maintained in Rule 1100 cases,
the trend is clearly toward a more flexible, subjective approach in
favor of maintaining a convicted defendant within the criminal jus-
tice system. In a sense, then, the prevailing standard in Rule 1100
cases is a "totality of interests and circumstances."
Rule 1100 probably serves as an appropriate paradigm for the
problems engendered by the creation of a seemingly prophylactic
rule containing nonspecific, value-laden terminology.89 The Rule, in
a sense, has tried to straddle the fence. The injection of amorphous
and normative standards of implementation, such as totality of the
circumstances, exacerbates this dilemma and may presage the inevi-
table death knell of the written Rule. The case, thus far, that has
come tantalizingly close to the demise of the procedural Rule, not-
withstanding its facial fidelity to its requirements, is Commonwealth
v. Terfinko.90
Terfinko establishes, in effect, a totality-of-circumstances ap-
proach that takes into account some almost startling criteria: the due
diligence of the Commonwealth in pursuing a case to trial after the
run-date deadline and the causative delay resulting from a defen-
dant's assertion of his Rule 1100 rights.91 Although the court major-
ity considered some of the relevant facts underlying the Common-
wealth's due diligence and the court system's judicial delay, the
court, without explanation, shifted gear and said that "It is evident
from the record of the Rule 1100 hearing that the constitutional
standard for a speedy trial has been met in this case. .. "92
The interjection of such new considerations and the unexplained
constitutional focus, which is not constrained by specific time limits
holding that waiver of Rule 1100 must be for definite time).
89. How objectively ascertainable, for example, are terms such as "due diligence" or
"earliest date consistent with the extension request and the court's business?" One commenta-
tor on the federal speedy trial rule, see supra note 77, stated that the federal statute, which
contains an "ends of justice" provision, contains no clear standards. The simplicity or mechani-
cal nature of such speedy trial rules may be nothing more than cosmetic.
90. 504 Pa. 385, 474 A.2d 275 (1984) (rev'g 298 Pa. Super. 640, 445 A.2d 202
(1982)).
91. In Terfinko, the D.A. had a pending extension motion at the time of the run-date.
Because the defendant refused to waive his rights under Rule 1100 when the D.A. was pur-
portedly ready for trial, the Commonwealth had to await the disposition of the extension
motion.
92. 504 Pa. at 390, 474 A.2d at 279 (emphasis added). See supra note 77.
or inflexible criteria, become all the more problematic with the
court's refusal to consider the separate relevant time periods in the
pretrial process. Previously, such periods had provided the courts
with a convenient and analytically ascertainable framework with
which to judge Rule 1100 compliance. The court now refuses to ap-
ply a cookbook approach to Rule 1100 analysis and instead provides
the following guideline:
Therefore, we hold the court en banc acted incorrectly in sepa-
rately metering each step in the pre-trial process against the due
diligence standard. Rule 1100 provides an overall standard of
180 days, not separate standards for each step. Its due diligence
exception should be measured against the whole not its separate
parts.93
The dismantling of a rule or the erosion of precedent may not
be plainly evident where the process of change, as in Rule 1100 mat-
ters, occurs over a period of time and in terms that still profess
fidelity to the rule or precedent. The passage of time and the stag-
gering proliferation of caselaw can insensitize one to concerns about
the past and future. Pressured litigators all too often are preoccupied
with the "bottom line" of an opinion and with the relevant legal
principle reduced to memorable simplicity. Whether the specific pro-
visions of Rule 1100 or its precedential caselaw, such as Common-
wealth v. Mayfield,94 provide any less flexibility or more guidance
for the bench and bar than the recent cases "interpreting" the Rule
is unclear. Maybe one day down the road, a belated acknowledgment
of the demise of Rule 1100 will occur. The response understandably
might be "nothing lost, nothing gained." The lurking danger, how-
ever, may be the substitution of a standard more amenable to prefer-
ence than analysis. In the meantime, the prophylactic application of
the 180-day constraint along with the Rule's implementing criteria
are still "on the books." An uneasy truce still exists. Justice Nix's
peripheral comments in Commonwealth v. Genovese pertinently ad-
dressed the zealous and indirect attempts to modify the Rule without
specifically confronting de facto abolition as follows:
If there are legitimate objections as to the prescribed time
93. Id. Can the sum of the parts, thus, be greater than the whole? Probably so if one
views the Rule's equation in constitutional terms.
94. The court in 1976 established the standard to be applied in granting a Common-
wealth's petition for extension of time under Rule 1100:
Henceforth, the trial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only
upon a record showing: (1) the "due diligence" of the prosecution, and (2) certi-
fication that trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court's
business; provided that if the delay is due to the court's inability to try the de-
fendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the causes of the
court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.
469 Pa. 214, 222, 364 A.2d 1345, 1349-50 (1976). See also supra notes 77, 89.
frame, or if it is improper to demand that the prosecution pro-
ceed with "due diligence" (recognizing that this term is relative
and not absolute), these objections may be aired through the
rule-making processes and appropriate modifications can be
drafted. We should not attempt to alter the rule on a case-by-
case basis or use the decisional process to provide undue al-
lowances for prosecutorial errors.95
B. Jury Trial Waiver
The aversion to rigid, prophylactic rules is again demonstrated
in the area of jury trial waiver colloquies. The mandate in Wil-
liams9" and its progeny that an effective waiver must be based on the
defendant's knowledge of certain essential ingredients of a jury trial
is no longer absolute.
In Commonwealth v. Carson,97 the court affirmed a superior
court panel's decision comporting with the flexibility approach. The
defendant, previously convicted of burglary and related charges in a
non-jury trial, asserted ineffectiveness on the basis of a defective col-
loquy that omitted the "members of the community" ingredient. The
issue in Williams had also been presented in the context of ineffec-
tiveness. Rejecting the defendant's claim, the court stated that Wil-
liams did not establish a prophylactic rule requiring "talismanic
questions" or a new trial whenever one of the ingredients specified in
Williams was omitted. The court found that the omission in Carson
did not establish a defective colloquy. Justice Nix, the author of Wil-
liams, concurred, but found that the colloquy was defective under
"the very clear language of Williams."98
Carson did not address the post-Williams cases that suggested
in language and result that Williams was intended to establish a
prophylactic, new trial rule. In any event, the result in Carson is
indicative of the anti-per se attitude, pro-flexibility approach in
which the court will look at all the evidence in the record to deter-
mine the extent of a defendant's knowledge and intelligence in the
forefeiture of his rights.
C. Guilty Pleas
The submission of a guilty plea is perhaps the most serious deci-
sion a defendant can make in his journey through the justice system.
95. 493 Pa. at 75 n.1, 425 A.2d at 372 n.1 (1981). In this regard, one is reminded of
the principle that the rules of criminal procedure are subject to strict construction. See Com-
monwealth v. Brocklehurst, 491 Pa. 151, 420 A.2d 385 (1980).
96. See supra note 36.
97. 503 Pa. 369, 469 A.2d 599 (1983).
98. Id. at 372, 469 A.2d at 600.
The significance of such a mea culpa, of course, goes beyond the
sometimes grisly exposition of the pathological perversity of an iso-
lated man awaiting his avenger's judgment. The guilty plea process
is abbreviated justice involving, on the one hand, the forfeiture of
fundamental constitutional rights and, on the other hand, economy
and convenience for a system besieged with criminals awaiting trial.
Since 1981, the supreme court has shown little indulgence toward
those defendants who have attempted to retract their admissions of
guilt on the basis of the system's noncompliance with procedural
safeguards.
Commonwealth v. Minarik,99 a plurality opinion, intimated the
demise of the inflexible application of Ingram.' The sentiments ex-
pressed in Minarik may have provided the groundwork for the sub-
sequent pivotal opinions in Commonwealth v. Shaffer,' and Com-
monwealth v. Martinez."0 2 The plurality opinion of Minarik refused
to apply an inflexible Ingram standard to a guilty plea tendered prior
to Ingram, notwithstanding the fact that retroactive application of
Ingram was applied in Commonwealth v. Minor'0 3 in 1976. Minarik,
who had allegedly killed his sleeping fianc6 with an ax before the
eyes of her helpless mother,'04 tried to withdraw his plea because
during the colloquy proceeding he was not provided with an outline
of the legal elements of the various degrees of criminal homicide in
understandable terms. In acknowledging the error of Minor, the plu-
rality expressed certain concerns that were aired more fully later in
Shaffer and Martinez. As Justice Larsen stated,
[A]Illowing guilty pleas like the one here in question to be with-
drawn on purely technical grounds would indeed have a negative
effect on our system of criminal justice. The guilty plea in this
case was valid in both form and substance when it was accepted
in 1971: to allow the withdrawal of such a plea would plainly
elevate form over substance. To allow the withdrawal of such a
plea would permit a criminal defendant to flaunt, in the face of
the trial court, that court's failure to comply with rules of proce-
dure that were not then in existence, and it would leave the trial
court to question its efforts in the administration of justice, in
the face of sweeping decisions which undermine its plea proceed-
ings because of its inability to predict changes in the law years
before they occur. . .. "I
99. 493 Pa. 573, 427 A.2d 623 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 859 (1981).
100. See supra note 44.
101. 498 Pa. 342, 446 A.2d 591 (1982).
102. 499 Pa. 417, 453 A.2d 940 (1982).
103. 467 Pa. 230, 356 A.2d 346 (1976), reargument denied.
104. This fact was noted by the court. The case serves as another example of the court's
particular sensitivity, understandably so, to the brutality of certain crimes.
105. 493 Pa. at 580, 427 A.2d at 627.
Then, in diminishing the significance of the lower court's failure to
advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, the plurality opin-
ion reiterated a far-reaching general standard of competency:
[C]ompetence to plead guilty depends upon whether the defen-
dant has "the ability to comprehend his position as one accused
of [murder] and to cooperate with his counsel in making a ra-
tional defense" and whether he has "sufficient ability at the per-
tinent time to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding, and [has] a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." ' 6
Commonwealth v. Shaffer abandoned the per se application of
Ingram in favor of a "totality-of-circumstances" test. The court,
without dissent, observed that the court's opinions in this area could
never have reflected an intent "to relinquish its traditional power to
consider certain circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea."1 '
Disavowing any intent to abolish the elements-of-the crime require-
ment of Ingram, the court nevertheless refused to permit a post-sen-
tence withdrawal of guilty pleas for murder and other crimes. While
the court believed that "blind adherence to a per se rule would not,
in this case, comport with any notion of remedying 'manifest injus-
tice,' "18 notably, the totality test was applied in a situation where
the guilty plea was tendered after the defendant had already gone
through two days of trial, including presentation of the Common-
wealth's case and two defense witnesses. Aside from the court's in-
sight that the defendant essentially received a good deal"0 9 and was
initially satisfied with his sentence, the accompanying concurring
opinion expressed dislike for legal technicalities and complexities, a
theme that was to be reiterated in Martinez.
The reductionist approach to the Ingram controversy was again
cogently demonstrated in Martinez."O In Martinez, the defendant
had not received a recitation of the elements of the crimes or malice.
The colloquy produced evidence of the defendant's admission of his
complicity in the fatal beating as well as detailed testimony by a
forensic pathologist regarding the nature of the wounds inflicted.
The relationship between a recitation-of-the-facts-of-the-crime and
the elements requirement is still frustratingly unclear with respect to
106. Id. at 582, 427 A.2d at 628.
107. 498 Pa. at 351, 446 A.2d at 596. The totality test was approved in Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), to determine whether a defendant was informed of the sub-
stance of the charges as opposed to its technical elements.
108. 498 Pa. at 349, 446 A.2d at 594.
109. The benefits accruing to a defendant, such as a sentence that is not too harsh, is a
factor that has appeared in recent cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Newell, 486 Pa. 474, 406
A.2d 733 (1979), (involving an ineffectiveness context); Commonwealth v. Anthony, - Pa.
__ 475 A.2d 1303, (1984) (involving the attempted withdrawal of a guilty plea).
110. 499 Pa. 417, 453 A.2d 940. See supra note 102.
the sufficiency of notice received by the defendant. The court, again
without dissent, found the "graphic illustration of the nature of the
injuries" sufficient to demonstrate malice. As the Martinez court
noted, "We need not explain the equation to the accused in technical
terms when there is evidence understood by the accused attesting to
the act itself." ' An "esoteric explanation of the elements of the
crime" was not necessary to effectuate a constitutionally valid plea.
Aside from the trend toward "totality-of-the-circumstances" flex-
ibility and simplicity in dealing with defendants who seek new trials
on procedural grounds, the lone concurring opinion offered a curious
and fascinating sentiment in the wake of Ingram's demise:
'[T]he evolving patchwork of colloquy requirements places an
onerous burden of uncertainty on the trial court, and affords nu-
merous grounds for challenge to the content of the colloquy
.. .' Until we devise a standard colloquy, uncertainty will per-
sist in the lower courts, and our appellate dockets will be choked
with the frivolous appeals which our present ad hoc system
invites.
1 12
One solution toward eliminating uncertainty is the creation of
per se rules. But such an approach is precisely the one that others
had erroneously believed to exist in the first place. It is possible that
the discarding of per se rules will eventually ricochet? If so, the
question remains: In what form?
D. The Interested Adult Rule
Kevin Christmas was approximately seventeen years and eight
111. 499 Pa. at 423, 453 A.2d at 944. Justice McDermott's concurrence in Shaffer,
stated that there was no need to give a defendant a short law school course on the nature of
the charges. "Adding more elements to the colloquy in order to clarify the procedures for the
defendant only increases the complexity which causes the confusion." 498 Pa. at 355 n.1, 446
A.2d at 598 n.l.
Following Martinez, the supreme court, in an ineffectiveness context, refused to permit
the withdrawal of a guilty plea attempted eight years after the adjudication of guilt. Noting
the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the favorable result obtained by the defendant, Justice
McDermott used the case as an opportunity for some "plain talk" about guilty pleas. He wryly
observed that a guilty plea is not a "ceremony of innocence" and that the defendant is before
the court "to acknowledge facts." Further, quoting Justice Flaherty in Shaffer, supra note
101, he stated:
The true constitutional imperative is that the defendant receive real notice of the
true nature of the charge against him the first and most universally recognized
requirement of due process.
Commonwealth v. Anthony, - Pa .... 475 A.2d 1303, 1306 (1984). Anthony tried
to withdraw his plea on the basis that he was not advised of the unanimity requirement. Nev-
ertheless, one need only return to Ingram to remind oneself that, at one time, the factual basis
for the plea and the elements of the crime were considered and treated as separate elements
which had to be satisfied on the record. See supra notes 44-45.
112. 499 Pa. at 426, 453 A.2d at 945 (emphasis supplied). The demise of Ingram and
the per se approach was made clear in Commonwealth v. Schultz, - Pa. - , 477 A.2d
1328 (1984).
months of age when he was arrested with 744 packets of heroin. Ke-
vin was the son of a police officer, who had an opportunity to consult
privately with him for fifteen minutes before Kevin gave his incrimi-
nating statements. A superior court panel majority, assuming argu-
endo the father's interest as a police officer did not defeat his interest
as a parent, nevertheless concluded that the per se rule of McCutch-
en"' had been violated because the police did not inform the father
of his son's constitutional rights before the consultation. Therefore,
the court ordered suppression of Kevin's statements and a new trial.
The panel, however, was reversed.11"
Christmas gave the supreme court another opportunity to dis-
card a per se rule in favor of a somewhat modified totality-of-cir-
cumstances115 technique in interpreting and applying Miranda"6
principles to juvenile defendants. Central to the court's decision was
its judgment that a per se rule did not serve society or justice well.
Indeed, upon re-examination of the per se rule promulgated by
McCutchen, we believe that protection of juveniles against the
innate disadvantages associated with the immaturity of most
youth may well be achieved in a manner that affords more ade-
quate weight to the interests of society, and of justice, while
avoiding per se applications of the interested and informed adult
rule that serve, in an overly protective and unreasonably pater-
nalistic fashion, to provide means for juvenile offenders to secure
suppressions of confessions in fact given in a knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary manner.' 17
The concurring opinion of two other justices also underscored this
normative conclusion."'
Thus, the McCutchen rule was overruled - without dissent -
in order to rectify the paternalism of the past and consider the inter-
ests of society and the justice system in the creation and application
of flexible rules of interpretation. Two important results emerged
from the process: the arsenal of tools of inquiry was again less sub-
113. See supra note 53.
114. Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989 (1983) (rev'g 281 Pa.
Super. 114, 421 A.2d 1174 (1980)).
115. The totality test was modified because it was encumbered by a presumption of
incompetency upon proof of an absence of an opportunity for consultation. The presumption,
however, could be rebutted by evidence clearly, demonstrating that the juvenile was in fact
competent. Justice Larsen's concurrence, joined by Justice McDermott, rejected the presump-
tion device and stated that it was really no presumption at all since the Commonwealth has the
usual burden of proving a voluntary waiver by a competent youth. Christmas, 502 Pa. at 225-
26, 465 A.2d at 993-94.
116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
117. 502 Pa. at 223, 465 A.2d at 992.
118. The result reached in Christmas should not have surprised anyone since there were
intimations of abolition in two cases where the court was equally divided. See Commonwealth
v. Nelson, 488 Pa. 148, 411 A.2d 740 (1980); Commonwealth v. Veltre, 492 Pa. 237, 424
A.2d 486 (1980).
ject to depletion with the removal of an automatic suppression device
and the chance of an adjudged defendant's playing potentially costly
gamesmanship with the system was minimized.
Within seven months of Christmas, however, the unanimous
consensus on the interested adult controversy eroded when a court
majority, upon further reflection, decided in Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams1 9 that the presumption aspect of the new totality test had to
be eliminated in favor of an unrestrained totality-of-circumstances
test. Eric Williams, almost eighteen years of age and charged with
robbery, had been able to confer privately with his father before the
Miranda warnings were given, but Eric argued that he should have
been given an opportunity for private consultation after the warnings
and that the failure should compel suppression. The court majority
rejected Eric's arguments and repeated its aversion to the prior pa-
ternalistic and unnecessarily protective per se rule. The majority fur-
ther felt that the nascent compromise, that is, the presumption alter-
native of Christmas, served no useful analytical purpose. 20 The new
totality test, expansive in application,'121 was thus employed to re-
spond to the majority's current intellectual and philosophical
reservations.
The new procedural rule, however, demonstrated the tenuous
compromise upon which Christmas had been based. The dissent-
ers 122 in Williams resorted to the atavistic, per se approach and res-
urrected McCutchen. In their return to the prophylactic, suppres-
sion-of-evidence remedy resulting from a violation of a defendant's
rights, the dissenters raised some serious questions about the ade-
quacy of the new test, the ease of application and the potential im-
pact upon the efficient functioning of the judicial system. The dis-
senters failed to address the societal costs of the new approach,
namely, an automatic suppression of relevant evidence. Nevertheless,
the continuing clash of values concerning the balancing of society's
and a defendant's rights in the interested adult controversy, one can
argue, has largely been inspired by nonlegal considerations. Chief
Justice Nix, in this regard, verbalized a pertinent observation when
119. __ Pa. .. 475 A.2d 1283 (1984) (aff'g 309 Pa. Super. 63, 454 A.2d 1083
(1982)).
120. Compare, for example, the analytical function of some of the components of Rule
1100 which appear to have been interpreted away by the court in Commonwealth v. Terfinko,
supra note 90.
121. The new totality test takes into consideration the following factors: defendant's age,
intelligence, experience with the criminal justice system, prior criminal record, physical and
mental condition at the time of arrest; absence of any abuse, coercion, threats or promises;
time and detention before confession; and opportunity to consult with an adult.
122. Chief Justice Nix and Justice Zappala dissented. As suggested, the unanimity of
Christmas proved to be misleading. A justice of the Illinois Supreme Court once remarked
that many opinions fail considerably to accurately reflect the state of mind of the court which
rendered the opinion. See Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 3 (1966).
he said that the "attack upon McCutchen has in large measure been
inspired by the heinous nature of the crimes the juvenile is capable
of committing. 123
E. Prearraignment Delay
The most direct response to an unworkable or unpalatable per
se rule is to simply overrule it. A less drastic alternative is to diplo-
matically create exceptions to the rule or redefine the rule by impos-
ing previously unexpressed conditions. The caselaw in the area of
prompt arraignment demonstrates the former approach; a recent
case on the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity issue exemplifies the lat-
ter. In the former, incriminating statements are retained in the adju-
dicatory process and the expense and risk of a new trial are avoided.
In the latter, the same cost/risk benefit is obtained. Beyond this ben-
efit, however, the imposition of conditions provides an opportunity to
suggest the possibility of an expanded scope of inquiry in the deter-
mination of guilt. This scope of inquiry represents a potentially
recursive process that could undermine the rationale for the exis-
tence of the rule itself.
The unanimous opinion in Davenport'24 contained the seed of its
own modification. In a footnote, the Davenport court observed that
the six-hour rule was a workable one and could readily be complied
with "in the absence of exigent circumstances."' 5 This dormant
statement later provided the basis for a strong retort to those who
asserted the inflexibility of Davenport's rule, issued, one might add,
in the context of a nineteen-and-one-half hour delay. Commonwealth
v. Jenkins' rejected the idea that Davenport's intent was to estab-
lish an inflexible per se rule. In refusing to divorce the six-hour rule
from its purpose, Justice Nix asserted that the underlying objective
has always been to discourage the obtaining of incriminating infor-
mation through coercive means. Nevertheless, for some, reinter-
preting the rule in light of its purpose was not sufficient. The concur-
ring opinion advocated the abolition of the inflexible rule, which was
denigrated as a "classic of technicality."' 27
Commonwealth v. Keasley 2 8 similarly demonstrates the two di-
vergent viewpoints. In Keasley there was a twelve-hour delay caused
by the unexpected absence of the arraignment judge whose clerk had
suffered a heart attack. The record indicated that the police dili-
123. __ Pa. at -, 475 A.2d at 1290 (1984).
124. See supra note 60.
125. 471 Pa. at 286-87 n.7, 370 A.2d at 306 n.7.
126. 500 Pa. 144, 454 A.2d 1004 (1982).
127. Id. at 152, 454 A.2d at 1008. Justice McDermott had expressed the same view in
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656, 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (concurring opinion).
128. 501 Pa. 461, 462 A.2d 216 (1983).
gently sought a substitute judge. The supreme court ruled that the
exigent-circumstances exception applied. 1 9 The concurrence, how-
ever, again advocated the rule's demise on the basis that it under-
mined the "truth-determining process" and resulted in the exclusion
of constitutionally permissible statements.
The exigent-circumstances exception received a more direct en-
dorsement in Commonwealth v. Travaglia.1 30 In Travaglia, a first
degree murder prosecution had been delayed by a forty-mile distance
between the place of arrest and the place of arraignment. The court
acknowledged that "although initially stated as mandatory," judicial
interpretation has subjected the Davenport rule to an exigency quali-
fication. Under the circumstances of this case, the court felt com-
pelled to be practical and to consider the "temporal and spatial reali-
ties." The exception was acknowledged, the rule was applied, and
the evidence was not excluded.
F. Insanity Defense Instructions
Commonwealth v. McCann13 1 involved a defendant who had
horrible destructive rape fantasies. One day he allegedly enacted
some of his fantasies by stabbing a woman twenty times. There was
no question in this case that the defendant was a highly dangerous
person. Defense counsel in the case had failed to request a Mulgrew
instruction on the consequences of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity
verdict. Interpreting the Mulgrew case as establishing a per se rule,
the superior court panel awarded the defendant a new trial.132
The supreme court reversed and considered the Mulgrew issue
in an ineffectiveness context. The supreme court said that "upon re-
quest" was a predicate to a Mulgrew instruction. 3 3 Mulgrew, which
the court said must be read in the context of its facts, 13  did not
establish a per se rule.
The ineffectiveness resolution, however, is more problematic be-
cause some of the observations could serve to eventually undermine
the rule itself. The supreme court, in rejecting the ineffectiveness
129. The lower court and the appellate panel, 301 Pa. Super. 597, 447 A.2d 639 (1982),
ruled that the prompt arraignment requirement had not been met and thus ordered
suppression.
130. 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983).
131. 503 Pa. 190, 469 A.2d 126 (1983).
132. See 302 Pa. Super. 442, 448 A.2d 1123 (1982).
133. Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433, 466 A.2d 1328 (1983), in which
the supreme court, in a murder case, clarified the lower court's obligation to charge on the
unreasonable belief aspect of voluntary manslaughter. Aside from relevancy and evidentiary
foundation requirements, the court stated that such an instruction must also be specifically
requested; there is no obligation on the court to charge on its own. At one time a trial court
had a duty in a capital case to charge a jury on all essential questions of law. See Common-
wealth v. McCloskey, 273 Pa. 456, 117 A. 192 (1922).
134. There was a request for such an instruction in Mulgrew.
claim, noted that commitment is not automatically mandatory after
a not guilty/insanity verdict. Specifically, however, the court further
stated that counsel's inaction was reasonable because the request for
such an instruction would have given the district attorney an oppor-
tunity to argue the possibility of the defendant's early release. Such
a consideration, assuming its validity, would have been factually
plausible in this case because the defendant had been previously re-
leased from a mental hospital. 135 The legal predicate for such an ar-
gument, however, is not free from unexamined acceptance. In Com-
monwealth v. Miller, 36 the superior court stated that the defendant
had been properly refused an opportunity to present expert testimony
on the probable length of his commitment and treatment. The court
viewed this extension of Mulgrew as clouding the issue of the defen-
dant's guilt, which was the perceived concern of Mulgrew in the first
place.
The recognition of an avenue for argument to the jury concern-
ing speculations on commitment is the type of interpretative accre-
tion that may serve to undermine the rule. The extension of Mul-
grew to the sentencing process may discourage defendants to raise an
important issue originally relevant only to the adjudication of guilt.
The court's opinion acknowledged that it has not addressed the per-
missible bounds of argument on the possible length of commit-
ment. 137 It is not clear, however, whether, in principle, the door al-
ready has been opened to such argument.
IV. Beyond the Per Se Category: Similar Concerns
The sentiments controlling or influencing the disposition of re-
cent cases have not been restricted to those in the per se category. A
spillover effect has occurred in decisions in the following areas: ad-
missibility of demonstrative and prior criminal conduct evidence; in-
effectiveness of counsel claims; and, to a lesser degree, sufficiency of
evidence assessments. Throughout the recent cases in those selected
areas, there appears an infiltration of particular factors influencing
the legal decision to be reached: (1) the augmentation or retention of
the tools of inquiry whereby relevancy successfully competes with
considerations of prejudice; (2) the eradication of checkmate-type
litigation caused by almost interminable postjudgment and appeal
claims; and (3) a shift in emphasis away from a paternalistic atti-
tude vis-A-vis the defendant and toward one based on considerations
of practicality, common sense, and flexibility. These concerns indi-
135. See the trial court's findings of fact cited by both the majority and dissenting
opinions.
136. 290 Pa. Super. 553, 434 A.2d 1282 (1981).
137. 503 Pa. at 198 n.5, 469 A.2d at 130 n.5.
cate that, as in the per se category, there is a fundamental adjust-
ment in the notions of "justice" and in the perception of the criminal
trial process.
A. Demonstrative and Prior Criminal Conduct Evidence
A photo of a battered victim in a bloodied pool or testimony
indicating that the defendant previously committed a crime contains
inherent risks to the presumed impartial determination of guilt or
innocence. Although such evidence may be relevant because of its
probative value, demonstrative and prior conduct evidence must al-
ways be carefully evaluated. Demonstrative evidence is cogent be-
cause it appeals directly to the senses without the intervention of
witnesses and enables a jury, in a sense, to bridge a critical spatio-
temporal gap. In homicide cases, photos of the victim can serve as a
powerful visual communication by the deceased and express a recur-
ring message which words can never adequately convey. Testimony
concerning a defendant's criminal past can be devastatingly prejudi-
cial because it can deflect attention from the commission of the
crime charged and focus attention on what is often a legally irrele-
vant issue, i.e., the nature and consistency of the defendant's charac-
ter. Such evidence, therefore, can incite potentially destructive forces
passion and prejudice.
1. Demonstrative evidence. - The lower appellate court was
reversed in Commonwealth v. McCutchen3 8 when it ruled that the
admission of two color slides of the six-year-old victim were too
gruesome and inflammatory for the jury. The case involved a heart-
wrenching portrayal of the brutal anal sodomy and murder of the
juvenile by the fifteen-year-old defendant. The slides, portraying an
unclothed, frontal view of a bloodied skull and gashes, and a close-up
view of the buttocks and torn anus,1 39 were taken in the course of a
post-mortem examination and were used to supplement the verbal
testimony of the medical examiner. Before dimming the lights in the
courtroom, the lower court judge carefully prepped and cautioned
the jury on what they were about to see. 40 The slides' depiction
lasted approximately thirty-six seconds.
The majority of the specially designated appellate court panel,
including Justice Nix,' 41 concluded that the slides did not satisfy the
138. 499 Pa. 597, 454 A.2d 547 (1982) (rev'g 274 Pa. Super. 96, 417 A.2d 1270
(1979)).
139. See particularly the superior court's factual narrative, supra note 138.
140. See 499 Pa. at 600-01 n.4, 454 A.2d at 548 n.4.
141. In order to expedite the backlog of homicide appeals, the supreme and superior
courts had a brief arrangement providing for special superior court panels to adjudicate some
of the homicide appeals pending in the supreme court. The arrangement, referred to as the
"essential evidentiary value" balancing test since the medical exam-
iner had been able to convey the facts to the jury and since the obvi-
ous motive was to appeal to the jury's passions. Citing Common-
wealth v. Scaramuzzino,42 in which the trial judge erroneously
admitted fourteen color slides (including depictions of the removed
heart of the victim, the nude body covered in dried blood, and glass
rods in the victim's wounds) to support the pathologist's testimony,
the panel reversed the defendant's murder conviction and awarded a
new trial.
In reversing, the supreme court acknowledged the inflammatory
aspects of the slides, but said that they were admissible for the pur-
pose of establishing a motive (sodomy) for the killing and the brutal-
ity of the beating. The court disagreed with the lower appellate
court's value judgment of the relevancy/prejudice equation as
follows:
To permit the disturbing nature of the images of the victim to
rule the question of admissibility would result in exclusion of all
photographs of the homicide victim and would defeat one of the
essential functions of a criminal trial, inquiry into the intent of
the actor. . . . In assessing the intent of the actor in a case of
criminal homicide, be it to inflict serious bodily injury or to kill,
the fact finder who deals in such an intangible inquiry must be
aided to every extent possible.""
The significance of McCutchen rests not in its disagreement
with the inferences drawn by the appellate court below, but in its
application of an "essential evidentiary value" balancing test
weighted in favor of a potentially expansive notion of relevancy em-
phasizing intent. There is no doubt that prior caselaw theoretically
permits the admissibility of inflammatory"" photographs when they
may be relevant to the jury's understanding of the alleged crime, the
defendant's connection and his intent. 145 Courts have admitted in-
"Special Transfer Docket" included the assignment of judges form the supreme, superior and
lower court judges to sit on the three member superior court panels.
142. 455 Pa. 378, 317 A.2d 225 (1974). The essential evidentiary value test was applied
in Commonwealth v. Petrakovitch, 459 Pa. 511, 329 A.2d 844 (1974), in which the court
suggested that the following visual considerations were relevant: the position of the body,
whether facial features were contorted and the presence or profusion of blood. See also Com-
monwealth v. Powell, 428 Pa. 275, 241 A.2d 119 (1968).
143. 499 Pa. at 602, 454 A.2d at 549 (emphasis added). Consistent with this expansive
view of the search for truth is Commonwealth v. Brinkley, - Pa. -, 480 A.2d 980
(1984), giving the Commonwealth a right to discovery of defense counsel's memoranda regard-
ing witnesses' statements.
144. The two-step analysis of relevance-versus-prejudice applies with respect to photos
that are inflammatory. Relevance is the criterion for non-inflammatory evidence. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977); but cf. Commonwealth v.
Petrakovitch, 459 Pa. 511, 329 A.2d 844 (1974) (dissent arguing a balance test also for non-
inflammatory photos).
145. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Petrakovitch, supra note 144; Commonwealth v. Sny-
flammatory photos when the photos were black and white or clinical
in nature without portrayal of the victim's face;146 and when the
photos served to clarify sharply conflicting testimony 47 or demon-
strated the physical facts attending the victim's murder. 14 8 Neverthe-
less, Justice Pomeroy's concurrence in Commonwealth v. Hubbard'9
is worthy of remembrance. Justice Pomeroy cautioned that when in-
flammatory photographic evidence is involved, the "essential eviden-
tiary value" test should always mean more than mere relevance, es-
pecially when such evidence, as intimated by the McCutchen court,
is cumulative in nature. The McCutchen case, however, seems to
make relevance the prevailing consideration even when the demon-
strative evidence is arguably cumulative. The approach is reminis-
cent of that taken in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 50 where the court's
pro-admissibility ruling rested on the acknowledgement that the hor-
rid and gruesome nature of evidence is never a sufficient ground
alone for inadmissibility - a picture of one in death is never pleas-
ant or aesthetic.
2. Prior criminal conduct evidence. - Defendants asserting
claims that they were prejudiced by evidence of their prior criminal
conduct suffered similar defeats in three recent cases in their at-
tempts to gain new trials. The relegation of the "gruesome" or "in-
flammatory" factor to a subordinate position was demonstrated in
Commonwealth v. Travaglia.'5' The case involved a direct appeal
from the lower court following convictions of first-degree murder for
der, 408 Pa. 253, 182 A.2d 495 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 504 (1963). Petrakovitch,
however, suggests that the visual evidence therein may not have been necessarily inflam-
matory. There is no per se rule that photos of corpses are inflammatory. See Commonwealth v.
Hubbard, supra note 144; Commonwealth v. Woodward, 483 Pa. 1, 394 A.2d 508 (1978).
146. See Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980) (black and
white photo showing victim in pool of blood without portrayal of the face); Commonwealth v.
Hubbard, supra note 144 (color slides of victim with no evidence of blood or contorted features
but with suggestion by the court that they did not fit in the inflammatory category); Common-
wealth v. Snyder, supra note 145 (photos of deceased without evidence of the bloodied head
portion).
147. Commonwealth v. Petrakovitch, supra note 144, where there was sharply conflict-
ing evidence as to how the shooting occurred.
148. Commonwealth v. Snyder, supra note 145 (photos admitted to show the location of
the points of entry); Commonwealth v. Hudson, supra note 146 (photos admitted to show area
where crimes were committed and position of corpse in a noninflammatory context); Common-
wealth v. Hubbard, supra note 144 (photos, apparently noninflammatory, admitted to indi-
cated manual strangulation).
149. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, supra note 144.
150. Commonwealth v. Snyder, supra note 145. See also Commonwealth v. Garcia,
Pa. __ , 479 A.2d 473 (1984), where the lower court selectively admitted three black
and white photos of the murder weapon (meathook), murder victim (portions of the body not
revealed) and the drag marks transversing a pool of blood on the floor of the grocery store
where the murder occurred. These photos were relevant to indicate the ferocity of the attack
and a reconstruction of the facts of the murder. There is a suggestion of potential inflam-
matory aspects but no prejudice assessment.
151. 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1984).
the killing of a police officer. The Commonwealth introduced testi-
mony from its witness about the defendants' criminal acts (abduc-
tion and shooting) preceding the officer's murder. The court ruled
that the testimony of the prior acts was admissible and relevant to
the issues of the defendants' motive and intent because the defense
claimed that the shooting of the officer was an accident. Then, in
dictum, the court addressed the propriety of such evidence at the
penalty phase. The court ruled that there was no reason for exclu-
sion if there was no embellishment or improper attempt. In the
court's opinion, "[w]here facts are relevant for a proper purpose at
trial, defendants may not be heard to complain about the horrid
character of such facts."' 52
The development and expansion of pro-admissibility principles
in the crucial phase of a homicide trial, i.e., the penalty phase, 153
were more directly demonstrated in Commonwealth v. Zet-
tlemoyer.154 In Zettlemoyer, the Commonwealth was permitted to
recite evidence of indictments against the defendant in another crim-
inal proceeding for the purpose of establishing "aggravating circum-
stances"in sentencing. Truly, the issue implicated life or death, not
guilt or innocence. The Commonwealth's reading of the indictments
extended to include the facts recited in the indictments. The su-
preme court said that the neutral reading of the facts of the indict-
ments, followed by cautionary instructions, was permissible. The
court noted, however, that the result might have been otherwise if
the indictments had been "loaded" with inflammatory or gory
details.' 55
As in McCutchen,sA the supreme court again disagreed with
the inferences drawn from potentially prejudicial photographic evi-
dence. In Commonwealth v. Reiss,157 three separate references to
the display of photographs of the victim by an investigator at a po-
lice station shortly after the incident were viewed as merely "pass-
ing" and nonprejudicial. The references came from the victim, the
police officer, and the lower court in its charge. The general rule, of
course, is that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of the de-
fendant's prior criminal conduct as substantive evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt. Once it is determined that a jury could conclude,
152. Id. at 494, 467 A.2d at 298.
153. In homicide cases, the penalty phase literally involves a matter of life or death. See,
for example, Justice Hutchinson's dissent and his comments about the importance of effective
representation at the penalty phase in Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 504 Pa. 455, 475 A.2d 714
(1984). A death sentence is subject to automatic review by the supreme court. See 42 PA.
C.S.A. § 9711 (h) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
154. 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), U.S. reh. denied, 104 S. Ct. 31 (1983).
155. 500 Pa. at 53 n.21, 454 A.2d at 956 n.21.
156. See supra notes 53, 138.
157. 503 Pa. 45, 468 A.2d 451 (1983) (rev'g 301 Pa. Super. 96, 447 A.2d 259 (1982)).
from photographic references, that there has been prior criminal
conduct on the part of the defendant, then prejudicial error has been
committed. 15 The superior court majority held that the comments
were not passing references because the jury was advised, of the
place of identification (police headquarters) and number of pictures
involved in the display (two packs of pictures, fifty per pack) without
any explanation about how the pictures came into the possession of
the police. The supreme court majority, on the other hand, stressed
that there was no use of a mugshot epithet or specific identification
of the source of the photos. The dissenters, characterizing some of
the suggested inferences as ludicrous, found prejudicial error war-
ranting a new trial.
B. Ineffectiveness of Counsel
Ineffectiveness issues have raised two important familiar consid-
erations: gamesmanship and depletion of valuable, but limited, judi-
cial resources. In many legal circles, the sentiment is prevalent that
postconviction collateral litigation159 has become unnecessarily bur-
densome and unmanageable. The skepticism and criticism engen-
dered by such issues have been harsh."'
The court in Commonwealth v. Crowley16 1 faced the spectre of
a drastic remedy when a Rule 1100-based ineffectiveness claim was
presented. Ordinarily, meritorious ineffectiveness claims result only
in a new trial, a costly remedy that still keeps a convicted defendant
outside of free society. With Rule 1100/ineffectiveness claims, how-
ever, the remedy is discharge. It is significant, therefore, that when
the supreme court established a constitutional standard' for assess-
ing Rule 1100 ineffectiveness claims, it interjected its view that inef-
fectiveness litigation can lead to "perversions of the adversary sys-
tem" created by result-oriented practitioners at a great cost to the
interests of justice and society. And when faced with a fourth post-
conviction petition, in which the lower appellate court reversed and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing, the supreme court in Common-
158. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 171, 292 A.2d 373 (1972).
159. See Post Conviction Hearing Act (referred to as PCHA), Act of Jan. 25, 1966,
P.L. (1965) 1580, No. 554, 19 P.S. §§ 1180-1 et seq. Repealed by Act of May 13, 1982, P.L.
417, No. 122, § 2 as amended, 42 PA.C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
160. See, e.g., Justice Black's dissent in Kaufman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 217, 235, 242
(1969); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970), cited by Justice Flaherty in Commonwealth v. Watlington, infra
note 173. See also Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). Consider also Justice Larsen's comments about so-
called Catch-22 ineffectiveness claims and "bogus" ineffectiveness tactics in Commonwealth v.
Stoyko, - Pa. n.7, 475 A.2d 714, 724 n.7 (1984). Stoyko was argued twice in
1983.
161. 502 Pa. 393, 466 A.2d 1009 (1983).
162. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
wealth v. Parker,53 condemned such an abuse of collateral review to
perpetuate meritless cases and said that it must be eradicated.
The shift in emphasis goes beyond the obvious philosophical dis-
enchantment with ineffectiveness abuse. There is also a noticeable
alteration of the applicable standard that almost approaches a total-
ity-of-the-circumstances analysis. The seminal case of Common-
wealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney"' established that the inquiry
focuses on whether the particular course chosen by counsel had some
reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests. In Com-
monwealth v. Dunbar,"6 5 reversing the superior court's order of dis-
charge, the court expressed a subtle variant of the standard: whether
in light of the alternatives available to counsel, the strategy actually
employed was so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have
chosen it.' The supreme court in Dunbar resorted to practicalities
of time and common sense, based on the concept of a "then-prevail-
ing practice," to reject an ineffectiveness claim.
In two other cases, ineffectiveness claims were not limited to an
assessment of the alternatives not chosen, but were expressed in the
context of the evidence of guilt. In the multiple (fourth) petition case
of Commonwealth v. Parker,16 7 the supreme court initially observed
that the proferred ineffectiveness claim was not relevant to defen-
dant's guilt or innocence and would make no difference to the out-
come of his trial. The Parker court noted further that it was not
oblivious to the "overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt."' 8
Previously, in Commonwealth v. Vogel,16 9  when the defendant
sought a fourth new trial, the court noted that Mr. Vogel unques-
163. 503 Pa. 336, 469 A.2d 582 (1983) (rev'g 229 Pa. Super. 68, 445 A.2d 151 (1982)).
Three justices concurred in the result.
164. 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352-53 (1967).
165. 503 Pa. 590, 470 A.2d 74 (1983). Three justices concurred in the result.
166. Maroney was not expressed in those terms but such a view was intimated in that
opinion, 427 Pa. at 605 n.8, 235 A.2d at 353 n.8, and shortly thereafter in Commonwealth v.
Hill, 427 Pa. 614, 617, 235 A.2d 347, 349 (1967).
167. See supra note 163.
168. Such references to sufficiency of evidence, in the context of adjudicating a disputed
procedural issue, have been made with increasing frequency. Note, however, that on ineffec-
tiveness claims, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1978 stated that a harmless error standard
was not appropriate. Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 393 A.2d 642 (1978). But see
infra note 173.
Notwithstanding Badger, the supreme court has considered the prejudicial impact of a
counsel's ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 490 Pa. 312, 416 A.2d 485 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Wade, 480 Pa. 160, 172, 389 A.2d 560, 566 (1978).
The element of prejudice in ineffectiveness cases is conceptually problematical. See, e.g.,
Maroney, 427 Pa. at 599 n.8, 235 A.2d at 353 n.8. The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently
acknowledged a "prejudice component" in the analysis of ineffectiveness issues. See Common-
wealth v. Garvin, - Pa. Super. -, 485 A.2d 36 (1983). See also Bines, Remedying
Ineffective Presentation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV.
927, 949-52 (1973). See infra note 173; Strickland, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067-69, infra notes 175-
76.
169. 501 Pa. 314, 461 A.2d 604 (1983), cert. denied, - U.S. ., 104 S. Ct. 1603
(1984).
tionably caused the death oftwo individuals in the course of a rob-
bery.' 70 Before proceeding to a brief resolution of the defendant's
ineffectiveness argument, the court rejected his double jeopardy
claims as proferred by a "misguided sense of 'fairness'."'' In lan-
guage that may have been influential in perhaps placing the ineffec-
tiveness claim in a more skeptical perspective, the court said,
"[m]oreover, we may not ignore the obligation to the citizenry of
this Commonwealth to assure that those who violate our laws will be
held criminally responsible for the pain and suffering resulting from
their behavior.'
72
Whether the perceived obligations to the citizenry will eventu-
ally compel a fundamental restructuring of the philosophy and func-
tion of collateral review is uncertain. During Chief Justice Eagen's
tenure, two justices advocated limiting collateral review to claims
constituting a denial of fundamental fairness significantly implicat-
ing the "truth determining process." '173 And in Commonwealth v.
170. Id. at 317, 461 A.2d at 605.
171. Id. at 327, 461 A.2d at 611.
172. Id. at 328, 461 A.2d at 604. There may be, of course, a number of factors fueling
discontent with ineffectiveness claims: (1) the volume and repetitiveness of such claims as per-
ceived by the public and the judiciary; (2) the ability of a defendant to have a claim, in effect,
repeatedly re-litigated by placing it in a new (ineffectiveness) context, see, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Hare, 486 Pa. 123, 404 A.2d 388 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Vogel, supra note
169 (where the P.C.H.A. court granted the defendant a fourth trial); (3) the judiciary's per-
ceived role in assuring that convicted defendants assume full and final responsibility for their
crimes, see Vogel, supra note 169, and the court's reluctance perhaps to vacate a sentence once
such responsibility has been adjudicated; and (4) the costs inherent in the award of a new trial
remedy following a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel. All of these considerations are argua-
bly tangential to a defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, a right
which is applicable to all the states. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
173. Justice Fiaherty, joined by former Justice Kauffman, stated the problem bluntly:
It is time for the Court to realize that we have inadvertently created a monster
of inefficiency and judicial wastefulness in our past interpretations of the PCHA.
That convicted prisoners, as a routine matter, should file endless petitions was
never contemplated under the PCHA.
Commonwealth v. Watlington, 491 Pa. 241, 249, 420 A.2d 431, 435 (1980).
As in the other issues addressed herein, concerns about costly or unpalatable remedies can
be mollified through a process of reformulating the substance or procedure of a given right. In
ineffectiveness cases, one need not address directly the problem of remedy in order to secure a
re-alignment of values; one need only re-design the legal equation. For example, the burden of
proof upon a defendant can be altered and, in the process, increased or made more difficult;
likewise, defense counsel's action can be viewed with greater deference (see, e.g., supra, text
accompanying note 166). In Strickland, the Supreme Court articulated an ineffectiveness
standard which will likely impose substantial practical and procedural burdens upon a defen-
dant who asserts that counsel deprived him of his constitutional right to effective assistance.
See infra notes 175-76.
One should not minimize the significance or potential impact of such procedural modifica-
tions. In a simulated appellate argument in the Supreme Court of the State of Heursia, coun-
sel for the defense, Mr. Brook, pertinently addressed the impact of a procedural modification
of the M'Naghten rule on insanity as follows:
Mr. Brook: The burden of persuasion, in the law, is a very functional mech-
anism. It allows, or requires, the finder of fact to resolve uncertainties against
the party who bears this burden of proof, so that a legal dispute can be finally
resolved. It is the law's means of achieving finality in the face of uncertainties.
The decision concerning who must bear the risk of nonpersuasion, i.e., the party
Parker, even the reversed superior court panel majority acknowl-
edged the vexing problem of multiple petitions and the urgent need
for reform. 174 In this regard, it is perhaps important to consider the
United States Supreme Court's recent articulation of the standard
governing assistance of counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment.
Contrary to caselaw in this jurisdiction, the United States Supreme
Court stated in Strickland v. Washington175 that, in addition to
proof that a lawyer's performance "fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness," the defendant must also prove the "reasonable
probability" of a different result. For the time being, a defendant in
Pennsylvania must show only a claim of arguable merit and the ab-
sence of a reasonable basis for counsel's course of action. As men-
tioned previously, the shift in emphasis in the terminology of the de-
fendant's burden of proof may have significant practical
consequences. Notably, in this regard, Justice O'Connor concluded
that "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must
be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
who will not prevail at a legal proceeding unless the finder of fact is sufficiently
certain about his contentions, reflects a societal judgment about the relative dis-
utility of arriving at an erroneous decision. In a criminal case, of course, two
types of errors might be made: acquitting an individual who is factually guilty
and convicting a defendant who is actually not guilty. Our society has made the
fundamental value judgment that the latter is the more serious error, and the
Supreme Court has thus required that the prosecution prove all facts necessary
to constitute the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. And it is not just the
magnitude of the burden of persuasion which is critical, but, more fundamen-
tally, who must bear that burden. In this context, when the state burdens the
defendant with proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, that
amounts to a value judgment that, in cases of uncertainty, society has opted to
criminally punish those who may well be mentally ill, and not responsible for
their actions, and thus not deserving of punishment because they are not truly
blameworthy. This is a perversion of acceptable social values and a manifest
misuse of the burden of persuasion as a legal instrumentality. (footnotes
omitted)
See Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law, 20 CR. L. BULL. 321, 335 (1984).
In Pennsylvania, the courts have occasionally modified the traditional two-prong test of
ineffectivness (existence of an arguably meritorious claim and the absence of a reasonable
basis for counsel's action), see Maroney, supra note 164, and Commonwealth v. Smith, 498
Pa. 661, 450 A.2d 973 (1982), by imposing additional considerations and burdens. If a defen-
dant has failed to demonstrate prejudicial harm or a causal connection between the alleged
ineffectiveness claim and a particular adverse result, the court may deny the claim. See Com-
monwealth v. Ford, 491 Pa. 586, 592, 421 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1980); Commonwealth v. John-
son, 490 Pa. 312, 416 A.2d 485 (1980); Commonwealth v. Vogel, supra note 169; Common-
wealth v. Clemmons, __ Pa -, 479 A.2d 955 (1984). Likewise, an ineffectiveness claim
may be unsuccessful if the record indicates that the defendant somehow received an advanta-
geous result. See Commonwealth v. Newell, 486 Pa. 474, 406 A.2d 733 (1979).
The prejudice consideration interjects a significant factor facilitating a reorganization of
priorities and values potentially to a defendant's detriment. The prejudice component is espe-
cially problematic because, aside from the elusive nature of such a concept and the difficulty of
proof, the supreme court rejected this factor in Commonwealth v. Badger, supra note 168. See
also Commonwealth v. Williams, 273 Pa. Super. 147, 416 A.2d 1132 (1979).
174. 299 Pa. Super. 68, 71-72 n.2, 445 A.2d 151, 152 n.2. See supra note 163.
175. -- U.S. __ , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
produced a just result.'' 7 6
C. Sufficiency of Evidence
Although sufficiency of evidence re-assessments by the highest
appellate court are infrequent, the supreme court recently reversed
an insufficiency determination by the lower appellate court. As in the
other legal areas, special concerns of philosophy and policy were
involved.
In Commonwealth v. Macolino,177 the superior court panel ma-
jority refused to infer control and intent from the fact that drugs
were found in a couple's bedroom. The supreme court's reversal"7 8 is
apparently based on what the court may have perceived as its com-
mon sense judgment of the evidence in light of all the circumstances.
The supreme court stressed that the defendants had exclusive control
of the residence and were alone at the time of the seizure; and evi-
dence indicated the presence of equipment and paraphernalia associ-
ated with drugs. The defendant's wife's equal access to the construc-
tively controlled area was not fatal, in the supreme court's view, and
presented a factor distinguishable from the constellation of facts con-
tained in the decisions 179 relied upon by the superior court. In clos-
ing, the Malcolino court noted that, "[a]llowing the Superior Court
order to stand would provide a privileged sanctuary for the storage
of illegal contraband. Simply by storing contraband in a place con-
trolled by more than one party, a spouse, roommate, partner, would
render all impervious to prosecution."' 8 °
One should not, however, extract a conclusion of universality
176. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 (emphasis added). See also Buba, The Standard
for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Pennsylvania - An Ineffective Method of Insuring
Competent Defense Representation, 86 DICK. L. REV. 41 (1981); Comment, Ineffective Repre-
sentation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM.
J. OF L. & SOC. PROB. 1, 45 n.162 (1977); Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443 (1977).
As the conclusion of this paper suggests, an opinion's articulation of intelligible standards
serves practical and symbolic functions. One may ask whether the standards of Strickland
provide sufficient guidelines for lower courts to assure fairness and consistency in resolving
constitutional ineffectiveness claims. Justice Marshall's dissent found the majority's standard
to be one of "debilitating ambiguity" and "so malleable" that, in practice, it will either have
no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is
interpreted." - U.S. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 2075, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 706. Nevertheless, is not
ambiguity or unpredictability unavoidable whenever one uses or places emphasis upon terms
such as "reasonable" and "prejudicial?" See Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 AM. CR. L. REV. 29
(1983).
177. 302 Pa. Super. 96, 448 A.2d 543 (1983), reargument en banc denied.
178. 503 Pa. 201, 469 A.2d 132 (1983).
179. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Tirpak, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971); Commonwealth v. Fortune, 456 Pa. 365,
318 A.2d 327 (1974); Commonwealth v. Chenet, 473 Pa. 181, 373 A.2d 1107 (1977).
180. 503 Pa. at 210, 469 A.2d at 136.
from one isolated case. In two other cases,""' the supreme court dis-
agreed with a panel's sufficiency-of-evidence assessment and reversed
convictions when two equally reasonable and conflicting inferences
existed.'
V. Counter-point for the Defense
The dimensions of the changes in criminal law cannot be prop-
erly appreciated unless one takes into account those responses which
fall outside a suggested pattern. The difficulty with most theories is
that there are always plausible exceptions that necessarily modify
one's point of view. And so it is with the defendant's turf in criminal
law. To conclude that the recent supreme court is inflexibly "pro-
Commonwealth" in orientation would be a serious mistake. Many of
the so-called "pro-defendant cases" (for want of a better term), ac-
tually have been advanced by one or two justices who are popularly
considered to be philosophically conservative (i.e., more prosecution-
oriented) in criminal matters. An examination of those cases indicate
that, as in the previous discussion, certain concerns preponderate.
For purposes of momentary simplification, the following observations
can be made about such pro-defendant cases: (1) the supreme court
has demonstrated a marked sensitivity to errors that have occurred
in the areas of self-incrimination, substantial misconduct by the
prosecution in the course of trial, and attempts by the Common-
wealth to achieve what is essentially a "second bite at the apple;" (2)
ineffectiveness will be found where there was no conceivable benefit
in counsel's course of action; and (3) new trials will be awarded
when the lower court is guilty of a clear mistake or misapprehension
of law.
It is impossible to ascertain the precise balancing process when
181. See Commonwealth v. Keblitis, 500 Pa. 321, 456 A.2d 149 (1983) (rev'g 281 Pa.
Super. 633, 425 A.2d 840 (1980)), where the court reversed the defendant's conviction of
manufacture of marijuana in light of evidence that there was equal accessibility to the garden
by three others. The analysis therein is compatible with that in Macolino.
The other case, Commonwealth v. Tribble, 502 Pa. 619, 467 A.2d 1130 (1983) (rev'g 302
Pa. Super. 595, 448 A.2d 1174 (1982)) is more troublesome. The court reversed a conviction
for theft of movable property because the inferences flowing from the presence of fingerprint
evidence were equally reasonable and conflicting.
182. The supreme court has, on other occasions, either affirmed lower courts' insuffi-
ciency of evidence determinations or reached the same result by reversing sufficiency determi-
nations. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dolfi, 483 Pa. 266, 396 A.2d 635 (1979) (convictions for
conspiracy and violation of lottery statute); Commonwealth v. Mason, 483 Pa. 409, 397 A.2d
408 (1979) (affirmance regarding defendant police officer's demurrer as to alteration of fire-
arms charge); Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 484 Pa. 388, 399 A.2d 347 (1979) (superior
court's reversal of sentence, regarding conspiracy to commit misdemeanor in office, affirmed);
Commonwealth v. Konz, 498 Pa. 639, 450 A.2d 638 (1982) (reversal and discharge with re-
spect to legal issue of spouse's duty to seek medical care for ill spouse); Commonwealth v.
Derr, 501 Pa. 446, 462 A.2d 208 (1983) (insufficient evidence of criminal conspiracy concern-
ing drug sale); Commonwealth v. Gallo, 473 Pa. 186, 373 A.2d 1109 (1977) (reversal and
discharge in theft by deception prosecution).
the court determines that a trial has been fundamentally unfair or
counsel's action so unreasonable as to deprive the defendant of the
effective assistance of counsel. One notices, however, that if a mis-
take has occurred in the context of a case involving minimal eviden-
tiary support to convict (e.g., no eyewitnesses) or evidence that is
crucial to conviction, then reversal for a new trial is not a remote
possibility.18 3 In many cases, articulation of the "harmless error"
computation is either nonexistent or problematic. The difficulty in
identifying and applying the balancing process vis-a-vis the particu-
lar facts of the case was adverted to by Justice Roberts in the semi-
nal case of Commonwealth v. Story' in 1978. Story established the
following uniform rule for a determination of harmless error from
the appellate court's perspective: 185 "[A]n error cannot be held
harmless unless the appellate court determines that the error could
not have contributed to the verdict. Whenever there is a 'reasonable
possibility' that an error 'might have contributed to the conviction,'
the error is not harmless."' 86 When the evidence of guilt is "over-
whelming", Story made clear the stringency of its new standard:
Unless the evidence claimed to be overwhelming is uncontra-
dicted we cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
jury would have resolved the conflicts in the same manner ab-
sent the improperly admitted evidence. Thus, we hold that, in
applying the overwhelming evidence test to determine if an error
is harmless, a court may rely only on uncontradicted evidence.
The uncontradicted evidence of guilt must be so overwhelming,
and the prejudicial effect of the improperly admitted evidence so
insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.8 7
This standard, for the moment at least, 88 applies to errors based on
federal and state law. The application of this standard, as well as the
standard of ineffectiveness, can only be understood in relation to the
particular facts of a case.
183. For example, the supreme court reversed for a new trial in Commonwealth v.
Smoyer, - Pa. ., 476 A.2d 1304 (1984), where the lower court had improperly admit-
ted hypnotically induced testimony which concerned the crucial issue of causation.
184. 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 159 (1978). Story was based on Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967).
185. In Commonwealth v. Norris, 498 Pa. 308, 316 n.5, 446 A.2d 246, 250 n.5 (1982),
Justice Hutchinson suggested that the Story standard is perhaps more appropriate to apply to
a fact-finder's judgment than that of an appellate court's review of errors of law. See also R.
TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF THE HARMLESS ERROR, 20-21 (1970); Saltzberg, The Harm of
Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973).
186. 476 Pa. at 409, 383 A.2d at 164.
187. Id. at 416-17, 383 A.2d at 168.
188. See supra note 185.
A. Self-incrimination
The supreme court has recognized that a reference to a defen-
dant's right to silence1 89 may be prejudicially reversible error not-
withstanding the issuance of cautionary instructions. In a voluntary
manslaughter case extending protections beyond federal constitu-
tional limits,190 the supreme court ruled that the prosecution could
not use the defendant's silence at the time of arrest to impeach his
version of events. In Commonwealth v. Turner,'9' the defendant for
the first time gave an exculpatory version of the shooting during
cross-examination. The prosecutor then asked, "[did you ever tell
the police that somebody was shooting at you?" Although the lower
court instructed the jury to disregard the question, Justice Flaherty
noted that the resulting prejudice was substantial because "there ex-
ists a strong disposition on the part of lay jurors to view the exercise
of the Fifth Amendment privilege as an admission of guilt. .. .
Particularly, one should note that Turner was the only one who
presented exculpatory evidence. Thus, in this 4-to-3 decision, the
court ruled that under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the existence
or absence of Miranda warnings preceding the post-arrest silence
should not affect a person's legitimate expectation not to be penal-
ized for exercising the right to remain silent. Refusing to speculate
on the actual effect of the impermissible reference, the majority
granted a new trial because the error might have contributed to the
verdict.
The rationale and result in Turner, however, prompted two of
the dissenters to reiterate familiar concerns about retiring "more of
the small tools available to the truth testing process" and the distor-
tion of the Constitution "into a manual for escape artists to ward off
every possible threat."' 93 The significance of the majority's rationale,
nevertheless, may rest with the fact that the reference to silence oc-
curred at the guilt phase of the trial. In Commonwealth v. Travag-
lia,94 a first degree murder case involving the shooting of a police-
man, the prosecutor, without undue attention, commented to the jury
at the sentencing phase about a codefendant's taking the stand and
not showing remorse. The other codefendant (nontestifying) main-
tained that such an argument implied that he also had a burden to
take the stand and show remorse. The supreme court rejected these
arguments because the guilt and sentencing phases are substantially
189. PA. CONST., art. I § 9; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
190. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (permitting the use of evidence of si-
lence before the Miranda warnings for purposes of impeachment).
191. 499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537 (1982).
192. Id. at 582, 454 A.2d at 539.
193. Id. at 588, 454 A.2d at 542.
194. 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983).
different with the presumption of innocence having no direct applica-
tion to the latter phase95
In an ineffectiveness 6f counsel context, the privilege against
self-incrimination afforded the basis for a new trial when testimony
by two Commonwealth witnesses, admitted without objection, served
to spotlight the accused's failure to take the stand. The Common-
wealth, in Commonwealth v. Tann,196 had two crucial witnesses who
were present at the scene of the crime and, as a result of a plea
bargain, offered to testify against Tann. Preceding the witnesses'
damaging testimony, however, the Commonwealth presented the tes-
timony of the witnesses' attorneys, who made repeated references to
their clients' voluntary and cooperative waiver of their rights to re-
main silent. Justice Larsen, speaking for a unanimous court, found
such testimony to be "absolutely irrelevant and highly objectiona-
ble." Since the accused was associated with the witnesses, Justice
Larsen noted that the testimony bolstered the witnesses' credibility
through a tactic which emphasized to the jury that the defendant
had the same opportunity to waive his rights. As a result of counsel's
failure to object, the murder conviction, involving a racial confronta-
tion, was reversed. Arguably, however, no conceivable benefit inured
to the defendant as a result of counsel's inaction.
B. Commonwealth's Unfair Advantage
1. Prosecutorial misconduct. - The power to prosecute is an
awesome one. When the Commonwealth has improperly exercised
such power, in fact or manner, reversal for the defendant may result.
Four recent cases illustrate this point.
Reversal has, for example, occurred when the Commonwealth
has exceeded permissible bounds of prosecution either through actual
prosecutorial misconduct or prejudicial conduct through one of its
witnesses. Commonwealth v. Percel1 97 required the supreme court to
find that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Throughout the
course of the defendant's second (four week) trial, the prosecutor
repeatedly was admonished by the court for asking improper ques-
tions of a key defense witness. The questions were improper because
they suggested that the defense was harboring an unreliable witness
capable of suppressing the truth and perverting the criminal justice
system. Because the prosecutor, in effect, scorned the trial court's
rulings about the inadmissibility of the witness' prior criminal charge
and the defendant's prior criminal record, notwithstanding limiting
195. Id. at 499, 467 A.2d at 300-01.
196. 500 Pa. 593, 459 A.2d 322 (1983). See also infra text accompanying note 212.
197. 499 Pa. 589, 454 A.2d 542 (1982).
instructions, the superior court's affirmance 98 of defendant's convic-
tions was reversed, subject, however, to a single dissent.199
Commonwealth v. Wallace2'" was a death penalty case in which
the prosecutor failed to correct false testimony of its chief star wit-
ness and to provide the defendant, upon his request, with informa-
tion regarding a witness' criminal background and record. Noting
that the district attorney had an affirmative and continuing duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence relating to its chief witness and to cor-
rect false material testimony, the supreme court unhesitatingly con-
cluded that "where the suppressed evidence might have affected the
outcome of the trial," ' 1 a new trial was required. Particularly con-
demned was the prosecutor's unilateral decision to ignore the de-
fense's discovery request rather than challenge it.202
Finally, in another more problematic case concerning
prosecutorial misconduct during the course of trial, statements by a
prosecution witness (a detective) about what an assistant district at-
torney said to the defendant ("I think you did it.") provided the ba-
sis for a new trial. The superior court panel in Commonwealth v. Di
Nicola0 1 found the exchange to be a minor and harmless occurrence
during the course of a four day trial. Two children and one adult
died of a fire of incendiary origin. DiNicola was convicted of arson
and three counts of second degree murder. The supreme court ma-
jority204 recognized that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence
to convict but found that the indirect personal opinion testimony to
be irrelevant to any issue in the case and inadmissible hearsay. The
new trial result in this case rests largely on a judgmental conclusion
of reversible prejudice without any further explanation of harmless
error considerations.20
198. 274 Pa. Super. 152, 418 A.2d 340 (1979). The homicide case was placed on the
superior court's Special Transfer docket. See supra note 141.
199. Justice McDermott noted:
To read the over three thousand pages of testimony, replete with the care and
patience Judge Geisz exercised, leaves no doubt that this defendant received a
fair trial and was convicted by overwhelming credible evidence. To suggest that
the passage of time dulled the trial judge's memory of the texture and fabric of
that trial is an arch gratuity. To make his careful admonitions to counsel, admo-
nitions that he never conceived as subjected to scornful disobedience, a basis for
a new trial is to my mind unsupportable and accordingly I dissent.
499 Pa. at 597, 454 A.2d at 546-47. See also supra note 168.
200. 500 Pa. 270, 455 A.2d 1187 (1983).
201. Id. at 279, 455 A.2d at 1192.
202. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 305.
203. 308 Pa. Super. 535, 454 A.2d 1027 (1982), reargument denied.
204. 503 Pa. 90, 468 A.2d 1078 (1983). There were two dissents. The Commonwealth
filed a petition for reconsideration, which was denied.
205. Justice McDermott's dissent, citing Commonwealth v. Upsher, 497 Pa. 621, 444
A.2d 90 (1982), emphasized the brevity of the prosecutor's exchange of remarks (during the
four day trial with 19 witnesses) and the absence of argument in the summation. He found no
prejudicial reversible error.
2. Improper prosecuilon. - The supreme court previously had
given indications of disapproval with the Commonwealth's attempts
to obtain an unfair advantage in relitigating an issue or reprosecut-
ing a defendant.20 6 Occassionally, the supreme court has referred to
this practice as a "second bite" of the apple."°
The "second bite" philosophy was extended to the area of pro-
bation revocation hearings in Commonwealth v. Brown.2 °a The issue
in Brown was whether a defendant could have his probation revoked
after he had been acquitted of the offense giving rise to the revoca-
tion proceedings. The superior court panel209 acknowledged a minor-
ity view supporting a collateral estoppel argument against revoca-
tion, but applied the majority position based on the differences in the
nature of the inquiry in the two proceedings and the focus of revoca-
tion as an effective rehabilitative tool. Nevertheless, the supreme
court characterized the Commonwealth's purposeful delay in seeking
revocation as an improper second-bite relitigation of a common issue
of ultimate fact: namely, did the defendant commit the subsequent
offense? In the majority view,2"' a contrary result would be "un-
seemly" and fundamentally unfair. Essential to the result was the
almost cosmic view of criminal justice as representing an "in-
termeshing" and harmonious system. Thus, Brown illustrates the re-
luctance to use procedural niceties or differences to justify what is
perceived to be a fundamentally unfair loss of liberty. 1
206. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), vacated
and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 458 A.2d 177
(1983) (no subsequent prosecution based on same criminal episode); Commonwealth v. Till-
man, 501 Pa. 395, 461 A.2d 795 (1983) (Commonwealth cannot appeal after judgment of
acquittal); Commonwealth v. Virtu, 495 Pa. 59, 432 A.2d 198 (1981) (no re-trial where prior
trial involved prosecutorial over-reaching in calling witness who had claimed privilege against
self-incrimination); 18 PA. C.S.A. §§ 109-111 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) (prosecution barred
by former prosecution); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). But cf. Commonwealth v.
Beatty, 500 Pa. 284, 455 A.2d 1194 (1983) (prior summary offense prosecution no bar to trial
for misdemeanor or felony offense). The operative constitutional concern in these cases is
double jeopardy.
207. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ackridge, 492 Pa. 90, 422 A.2d 487 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Ehredt, 485 Pa. 191, 401 A.2d 358 (1979). Cf. Commonwealth v. Dobson, 486 Pa.
299, 405 A.2d 910 (1979) (defendant not entitled to relitigate suppression issue); Common-
wealth v. Berkheimer, 501 Pa. 85, 460 A.2d 233 (1983) (defendant entitled to reconsideration
of suppression motion in the interests of justice).
208. 503 Pa. 514, 469 A.2d 1371 (1983).
209. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 281 Pa. Super. 348, 422 A.2d 203 (1980).
210. Justices McDermott and Hutchinson dissented.
211. But cf. Commonwealth v. Crenshaw, 504 Pa. 33, 470 A.2d 451 (1983) (evidence at
first trial, resulting in acquittal, was not barred at second trial for different offense where
evidence of common scheme and defendant's confession were not pivotal to jury's determina-
tion in first trial).
C. Ineffectiveness of Counsel
In addition to Commonwealth v. Tann,21 2 in which counsel
failed to object to improper testimony impinging upon the accused's
constitutional right to remain silent, the supreme court has indicated
its willingness to find ineffectiveness of counsel in other cases. Three
cases suggest that ineffectiveness will be found, and a new trial
awarded, when counsel's action or inaction has been particularly
egregious, without any intelligible underlying rationale, or when
counsel's conduct concerned an important issue in the case.21 3
In Commonwealth v. Jones,21 4 for example, counsel for the de-
fendant, who was charged with first degree murder, erroneously in-
troduced evidence of his client's prior criminal record in the mis-
taken belief that the Commonwealth could use such evidence to
prove the existence of a common scheme, habit or motive. The prior
crimes concerned aggravated assault and terroristic threats.2" 5 De-
fense counsel believed that the introduction of such evidence would
establish defendant's truthfulness and integrity, although, as the su-
preme court noted, his character was not put in issue. Based on
counsel's misunderstanding of the law of evidence, a new trial was
awarded.
The supreme court reversed a superior court panel in Common-
wealth v. Boykin21 because, upon retrial, defense counsel failed to
make a timely motion for severance. In a prior trial, Boykin had
been partially acquitted. Upon retrial, with his codefendants, Boykin
would have been prejudiced by the admission of evidence of those
crimes of the other defendants for which he had been acquitted. The
supreme court majority, subject to three dissents, saw no potential
benefit or strategy justifying counsel's tardy action in seeking
severance.
217
The critical nature of neglected evidence provided the basis for
an ineffectiveness-based new trial in a first degree murder/death
212. See supra note 196.
213. The court, of course, first determines whether the proposed ineffectiveness issue
presents arguable merit. See Commonwealth v. Jennings, 285 Pa. Super. 295, 427 A.2d 231
(1981).
214. 499 Pa. 522, 454 A.2d 8 (1982). Defendant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter.
215. Since these crimes did not concern defendant's veracity and since his character or
reputation was not at issue, this evidence would have been inadmissible. See Jones, 499 Pa. at
526 n.I, 454 A.2d at 10 n.I.
216. 501 Pa. 250, 460 A.2d 1101 (1983) (rev'g 276 Pa. Super. 56, 419 A.2d 92 (1980)).
217. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 495 Pa. 362, 433 A.2d 1349 (1981), the court found
ineffectiveness when defense counsel made an untimely request for severance. The distinction
between Smith and Boykin is that in the former the defendant had a statutory right, see Act
of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, § 40, 19 P.S. § 785, repealed by Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202,
No. 53 § 2(a), to be tried individually. See also Commonwealth v. Von Smith, 486 Pa. 564,
406 A.2d 1034 (1979).
penalty case. The focus of the ineffectiveness, however, was an inter-
esting one. Counsel for the defense in Commonwealth v. Smith21 8
was found to be ineffective because he failed to respond more fully to
the lower court's limitation upon the defendant's right to cross-ex-
amine a crucial key witness. Apparently, the key witness may have
been the one responsible for the murder. This possibility was under-
scored by evidence that the female witness had previously confessed
to another killing, which, in the supreme court's view, bore striking
similarities to the one for which Smith was on trial. Whereas counsel
in Boykin did "too little, too late," counsel in Smith provided his
client with the basis for a new trial because he, in effect, had not
done enough. Three justices, incidentally, concurred in the result.
D. Errors of Law
When the lower court, in the supreme court's view, has misap-
plied the law, the supreme court may order a new trial or reverse the
lower court." 9 The lower court, for example, in Commonwealth v.
Cooper,220 erroneously informed the defendant in a jury trial waiver
colloquy that he would have to convince twelve jurors of his inno-
cence. Such positive misinformation resulted in a per curiam reversal
of the lower court majority22" ' and the award of a new trial.
In two cases, the supreme court's interpretation of statutory law
resulted in decisions favoring the defendant. The supreme court, in
the context of a case without any eyewitnesses, ruled that the defen-
dant in Commonwealth v. Pollino"2 ' was denied a fair trial because
the lower court failed to charge the jury that the defendant did not
have a duty to retreat. The case involved a prosecution of an appar-
ently diminutive man claiming self-defense against a larger club-
wielding antagonist. Citing lower appellate court cases for the pro-
position that one is under no duty to retreat when attacked, the su-
preme court reversed for a new trial. Then, in Commonwealth v. As-
218. 502 Pa. 600, 467 A.2d 1120 (1983).
219. An error of law, however, will not necessarily result in a new trial. The lower court
in one case gave an undisputed erroneous instruction on self-defense which placed the burden
of proof on the defendant. The jury convicted the defendant of murder and the superior court
granted a new trial because of the erroneous instruction. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 312 Pa.
Super. 501, 459 A.2d 14 (1983) (reargument denied). The supreme court, after describing
Simmons as a "feckless ruin of juvenile gang war," reversed because in its view there was
insufficient evidence to support the charge in the first place. Simmons, 504 Pa. 565, 475 A.2d
1310 (1984). The point of departure between the two appellate courts were their different
interpretations of a statement given by the defendant as a basis for the instruction on self-
defense. Cf. Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433, 466 A.2d 1328 (1983) (defendant not
entitled to particular voluntary manslaughter instruction where there is no evidence to reason-
ably support it).
220. 503 Pa. 29, 467 A.2d 1301 (1983).
221. 308 Pa. Super. 607, 454 A.2d 162 (1982).
222. 503 Pa. 23, 467 A.2d 1298 (1983).
kin,22  the supreme court disagreed with the lower court's
interpretation of the limitations' statute for conspiracy. The "plain
language" interpretation resulted in a per curiam reversal of Askin's
conviction for conspiracy.
VI. Conclusion: The Content and Communication of Justice
Predictability was identified initially as a desirable goal in the
process of interpreting and applying the law. The discussion thus far
represents an attempt to take a segment of the Commonwealth's
criminal jurisprudence and extrapolate some common concerns that
perhaps gave direction to the law at a given period. It would be a
smug conceit or pious deception, however, to conclude that principles
of universality or logic control all cases. Uncertainty in the law, as
Justice Cardozo once observed, is inevitable.
I was troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find
how trackless was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought
for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I found
that the quest for its was futile. I was trying to reach land, the
solid land of fixed and settled rules the paradise of a justice that
would declare itself by tokens plainer and more commanding
than its pale glimmering reflections in my own vacillating mind
and conscience. . . . As the years have gone by, and as I have
reflected more and more upon the nature of the judicial process,
I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have
grown to see it as inevitable .... 2
Once predictability and uncertainty are placed in the proper
perspective, one can then proceed toward a healthier understanding
of what has happened in the law. That a significant shift or re-orien-
tation of interests has occurred is clear. Reversals of lower court de-
cisions may represent either simple or profound, short-term or long-
term deviations. Only the passage of time will determine whether
such a constellation of intermittent changes will establish a cogniza-
ble pattern or merely reflect a history of fluctuating, insubstantial
creeds. The magnitude, rapidity and integrity of such changes, how-
ever, cannot be minimized or ignored in considering the efficacy of
the legal process. Thomas Sowell spoke about such deviations in this
way:
In criminal law, as in other social processes, there are in-
herent constraints of circumstances and human beings, and
these constraints entail trade-offs. The repugnance and pain
223. 502 Pa. 575, 467 A.2d 820 (1983) (modifying 306 Pa. Super. 529, 452 A.2d 851
(1982)).
224. B. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 529 (1921).
which a conscientious person feels at the thought of imprisoning
or executing an innocent man, or letting a guilty sadistic mur-
derer go scot-free back into society on a technicality, in no way
removes [sic] the constraints or relieves the essentiality of trade-
offs. The ideal of "a government of laws and not of men" im-
plies an established process rather than ad hoc judgments of
what is right in each case. Inherent in this are deviations be-
tween the particular consequences of a systemic process and the
individual results most in accord with the principles that the
process was meant to embody. The more effective the legal
processes, the smaller are these deviations, but in any process
conceived and carried out by human beings there will be devia-
tions - and in some cases, extreme deviations. Legal systems
try to reduce these extreme deviations by allowing appellate
courts to review cases. But to some extent this recreates the
original dilemmas of trial court systems at the appellate court
level.22
The deviations witnessed in the all too brief period of Pennsyl-
vania criminal law embody fundamentally a sociologically oriented
perspective focusing on the proper role and function of law and the
courts within a particular society at a given time.226 The goals and
interests expressed in many of the recent opinions have certainly
been impregnably laudable. One can appreciate the response to per
se rule-making, which some may feel restricts flexibility and puts
blinders on those who have the onerous task of participating in that
elusive force known as justice. One can also appreciate perhaps the
reorientation toward a more collectivist rather than individualist
viewpoint that attempts to identify and implement public norms and
values. And again, a decision-making process, which takes into ac-
count the inherent costs (new trials, suppression of evidence, dis-
charge of a defendant), cannot be criticized on that basis alone.22?
The net result from a sociological view is the transmission of knowl-
225. SOWELL, supra note 1, at 272-73.
226. Consider particularly Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1911), and 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912). One might also
submit that the abrogation of per se rules has a significant political dimension in the sense of
liberating judicial power from the shackles, albeit self-imposed, placed on traditional decision-
making functions, such as the discovery and balancing of facts toward a selection of various
possible legal conclusions. This political consideration, however, is beyond the scope of this
article. Consider, for example, Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342, 351, 446 A.2d 591,
596 (1982) in which Justice Flaherty disclaimed any prior intent of the court to relinquish its
traditional power to consider the circumstances surrounding the entry of a guilty plea.
227. T. Sowell observes:
One of the most important ways in which knowledge is screened out of the crim-
inal justice system is either by excluding it from trial or reversing the conviction
in the appellate courts because it was not excluded. Evidence acquired without
following minutely prescribed procedures can also be excluded, without regard to
how accurate, verifiable, or relevant it may be.
SOWELL, supra note 1, at 272.
edge or a message to society that will perhaps produce lowered ex-
pectations 21a concerning the rights of the defendant vis-a-vis society.
Nevertheless, in the pursuit of restructuring or replacing the
equations of the past, costly risks are ever-present. First and fore-
most, the danger of viewing "the defendant" as a stereotypical male-
factor always exists and, consequently, in addressing the particular
legal issues in a fashion, as one justice recently commented, that
does not go beyond a "theoretical analysis." '29 The unappreciated
pitfall, of course, is an unnecessary dilution of procedural and consti-
tutional safeguards of that defendant - and others - in the future.
Second, one might argue that a so-called aversion to "technical-
ities" can be carried to a dangerous extreme. The law is necessarily
built on technicalities and rules. Not all technicalities are without a
valuable purpose and function. From an economist's point of view,
the establishment or demolition of such technicalities can involve se-
rious "trade-offs", as Thomas Sowell would say.
Third, in the attempt to restructure the present legal order, the
danger is always present that the desire for rapid change may facili-
tate a disingenuous glossing over of precedent or principles of stare
decisis. Deviations predicated on such decision-making may very
well provide the type of critical fodder exemplified in the previously
mentioned dispute between Professors Hart and Arnold.
Fourth, in creating or undermining precedent on the basis of
exceedingly broad rules or values, we jeopardize the knowledge and
transmission aspects of the legal process. On the one hand, those
228. The following observation by Sowell is also pertinent:
Changes in the criminal law change the effectiveness with which knowledge can
be transmitted to those deciding innocence or guilt, to criminals contemplating
crime, and to the voting public assessing their experience and assessing the pro-
tection offered - or not offered - by the criminal justice system.
SOWELL, supra note 1, at 271.
Whether changes in the law and the communication of such changes have an actual deter-
rent effect on crime is, of course, another separate and controversial matter. See generally,
Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DIcK. L. REV. 1 (1983).
It is interesting to note that serious crime in Pennsylvania, according to state police statis-
tics, reportedly dropped 7.3% in 1983, the third straight year of a decline. The drop was com-
parable to the national average. For example, in Pennsylvania in 1983, murders dropped 14%
to 583; forcible rapes 0.3% to 2,441; robberies 1.4% to 20,464; aggravated assaults 8.6% to
17,150; burglaries 9.4% to 96,378; arsons 13.4% to 3,417; and motor vehicle thefts 4.9% to
37,332. Phila. Inquirer, June 29, 1984, at 5-B, cols. 4-6. In a related matter, the Pennsylvania
Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) postulated that Pennsylvania was spared 550
armed robberies and five homicides in 1982 as a result of the state law on mandatory sentenc-
ing imposing a five year sentence for crimes committed with a gun. See Phila. Inquirer, May
8, 1984, at 8-B, cols. 1-4.
The F.B.I. similarly stated that the number of serious crimes reported to the police in the
first half of 1984 was five percent below the figure for the first six months of 1983. The half-
year drop followed the first two consecutive year-long declines since 1960. Increases, however,
were reported for rape, aggravated assault, motor vehicle theft, and arson. See N.Y. Times,
October 28, 1984, p. 27, cols. 1-4.
229. See the dissent in Commonwealth v. McCann, 503 Pa. 190, 200, 469 A.2d 126,
130, 131 (1983).
who must understand the law before applying it may inevitably face
difficulty in assessing concepts or terms that are almost impervious
to rational analysis. Essentially, they will have to feel their way
through the maze of justice. On the other hand, in the positing of
decisions upon broad but reasonably intelligible principles, one may
discover eventually that the generalized notions of today may be in-
adequate to meet the specific dilemmas of tomorrow.
Last, in the sincere endeavor to emasculate or abandon per se
rules, the original intendment and actual benefits of such rules may
not be appreciated. Each rule of law carries its own costs and risks
accoutrement. The establishment or demolition of a rule of law nec-
essarily involves the identification, competition and selection of pri-
orities implicating the interests of the judicial administrative system,
the rights of the defendant, the concerns of society, and the efficacy
of the process designed to determine guilt and innocence. Despite the
necessary consequences of repeated litigation to define the scope of
any rule, it cannot be denied, for example, that per se rules, such as
Rule 1100 and Davenport, have served society and defendants.
Recognizably, however, those rules have also imported special
burdens into the system. Jeremy Bentham, educated as a lawyer,
once addressed his readers' attention to the fundamental importance
of the problem of language and decision-making in the field of law
and politics. In his Book of Fallacies,230 he refers to the fallacy of
"allegorical idols" whereby the name of a fictitious entity (such as
the "church" or "law") is conveniently used as a substitute for those
who in fact make the decisions (such as the elders or lawyers). And
so it is with the judiciary. It would be fallacious to presume that the
"court" at any given time in history makes a decision. There is no
such thing as an "institutional intent."21 3' Decisions are made by
human beings in a politically collective process that produces the fal-
lacy of a consensus. Thus, it is essential to realize both the source of
and factors affecting decision-making in the law. Justice Holmes had
no romantic preconceptions of the law. He once stated:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudice which judges share with their fellow-man, have
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed.
232
That there can and does occur subordination of legal concepts
to expediency and changing notions of justice was an "old truth"
230. J. BENTHAM, BOOK OF FALLACIES 69-72 (1952).
231. See, e.g., supra note 122.
232. LERNER, supra note 3, at 51-52.
that Justice Cardozo said needed to be restated now and again. 3
For Cardozo, and certainly for many who today must administer and
interpret the law, the final cause of law is the welfare of society
whose social advantages must sometimes be taken into account. The
stability of legal norms"" may be the prevailing value for certain
decision-makers. For others, the motivating force may be their con-
cept of justice. Eugen Ehrlich's commentary on justice provides a
springboard toward further reflection:
That a certain thing is just is no more scientifically demonstrat-
able than is the beauty of a Gothic cathedral or of a Beethoven
symphony to a person who is insensible to it. All of these are
questions of the emotional life. Science can ascertain the effects
of a legal proposition, but it cannot make these effects appear
either desirable or loathesome to man. Justice is a social force,
and it is always a question whether it is potent enough to influ-
ence the disinterested persons whose function it is to create ju-
ristic and statute law. 35
Yet such an approach, however meritorious or necessary, is not
entirely satisfactory. An exaggerated reliance on justice-is-in-the-
eyes-of-the-beholder philosophy can be as detrimental or self-defeat-
ing as a slavish adherence to precedent.236 The brief epoch of per se
rule-making raises some fundamental issues about the dynamics of
decision and rule-making as well as the agenda for the future. One
may ask, how intelligent and voluntary was the alliance with per se
justice? Others, likewise, may question whether the accelerated
counter-revolution against per se rules, flanked by certain repetitive
values and concerns, reflects a rational or productive protest. Not-
withstanding different philosophical viewpoints and aside from the
broader issue whether judges make or discover law, has there been
an empirical basis for either course of action? What, for example, is
the foundation for the belief (or hope) that a speedy trial/discharge
rule, encumbered by value-laden exceptions, will actually reduce
233. B. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 64 (1928).
234. Eugen Ehrlich spoke of the importance of the stability of legal norms in terms of
the economics of decision-making and the sovereignty of the state. See EHRLICH, supra note 2,
at 121-36.
235. Id. at 460-61. Ehrlich noted that the bulk of complaints about unsatisfactory laws
concerned the functioning of norms in situations for which they were not created and to which
they were not adapted.
236. Blackstone, a staunch advocate of precedent, acknowledged the limitations of pre-
cedent where a law is contrary to reason, manifestly absurd or unjust. In such circumstances,
Blackstone rationalized that the law was not a bad law, but that it was simply not law and,
therefore, could be ignored or overruled. I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 69 (Sharswood ed. 1886). See also CARDOZO, supra note 224, at 149-56, where he
observes that, at that time, there was some sentiment to abandon the principle of precedent
altogether and that, at least in procedural matters, change can occur with greater freedom
from precedent. See also Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1953).
backlogs (trial and appellate), promote administrative convenience
or establish uniformity? What were the underlying assumptions,
values and goals that prompted the creation of a rule requiring a
recitation of the nature of a crime and its legal elements to the de-
fendant before the acceptance of a guilty plea? Are such require-
ments unreasonable or beyond the grasp of accomplishment?
On the other hand, have we explored whether, for example, the
Davenport rule has resulted in prompt arraignments? Or did the
McCutchen rule provide an easy workable basis for not only safe-
guarding a minor's rights but also for minimizing litigation on such
an issue? What have been the realities of our experience?237 Have
our actions in these and other areas rested more on the ebb and flow
of unassailable and unverifiable principles than on a consideration of
pragmatic consequences? And if so, should there not be a frank ac-
knowledgment? And with regard to fundamental values, is per se
rule-making, in principle or specific application, really antithetical to
our notions of justice and fairness? Can such rules ever serve a use-
ful or limited purpose?238
Decision-making by an antimajoritarian branch of government
in a democracy cannot isolate itself from political and societal pres-
sures. Competence and legitimacy, concerns which forever impinge
upon the integrity of the decision-making process, are determined
not only by the quality of the decision-making process but also by
the public's (bench, bar and populace) perception of that process.
One commentator has suggested that the judicial function, in giving
meaning to public values through the enforcement and creation of
public norms, is constrained by two special burdens: the obligation to
participate in a dialogue about the meaning of public values, and the
obligation to justify a decision.23" The insularity of the court and the
237. These varying concerns have, to some degree, been expressed most notably in dis-
sents by Chief Justice Nix and Justice Zappala. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Terfinko, 504 Pa.
385, 474 A.2d 275 (1984) (J. Zappala's dissent on a Rule 1100 issue); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984) (J. Zappala's dissent on the interested adult
rule); Commonwealth v. Schultz, - Pa. -, 477 A.2d 1328 (1984) (C.J. Nix's dissent on
the requirements of a guilty plea colloquy); and Commonwealth v. Genovese, 493 Pa. 65, 425
A.2d 367 (1981) (J. Nix's dissent in a Rule I100 case). Consider, for example, the study of
the federal speedy trial rule based on data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
supra note 77.
238. Does per se justice exist in other forms or serve a purpose? Consider the dissent in
Commonwealth v. Manley, 503 Pa. 482, 469 A.2d 1042 (1983), where the dissent interpreted
the majority's Rule 1100 holding as establishing a per se rule. Consider also the nature and
requirements of Pennsylvania's Mandatory Sentencing Act, 42 PA. C.S.A. §§ 2154, 9712-9716
(Purdon Supp. 1981-1982). In the civil area, consider Justice Larsen's guidelines in determin-
ing the amount of child support in Melzer v. Witsberger, - Pa. __, 480 A.2d 991 (1984)
(rev'g 315 Pa. Super. 626, 463 A.2d 28 (1983)).
239. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Forward - The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1979). The focus of the article was on constitutional values and rules. An-
other scholar has addressed the fundamental problem of considering the antimajoritarian func-
tion of judicial review in terms of legitimacy and traditional democratic principles. He con-
perceived obligation of being responsive to the public's values create
a dynamic tension; somehow, in adjudicating particular controversies
between specific parties, the court must avoid the pressures of prefer-
ence and the casuistries of logic. The tension can become especially
acute when the insular body-politic, unbeholden to any constituency
in the traditional sense, takes upon itself the difficult task of going
beyond specific controversies in enacting procedural rules or norms
of pervasive impact.
Whether the court's task is one of conflict-resolution or rule-
making, the obligations of dialogue and justification, applicable to
both tasks, reflect nothing more than the necessity of being respon-
sive to the needs and sometimes conflicting demands of society. It is
with respect to this sensitive political dimension of the court's role in
society that opinions of the court bear such crucial significance.
Opinions can play both symbolic and functional roles. Functionally,
opinions, although discretionary and nonessential to the legitimacy
and competency of the court, serve the parties in communicating the
basis for the court's action. Opinions represent, in a special sense, an
official medium of communication with the public and provide an
effective channel for transmitting information and facilitating knowl-
edge of the law. Symbolically, the collective voices of an opinion
serve as a visible guarantee that the court is exercising its democrati-
cally created function to adjudicate legitimately and competently. In
this respect, opinions reach beyond the parochial interests of the par-
ties before' the court and speak to all of society. In an information-
acquisitive and inquisitive world of mass communication, vigilance of
the courts becomes a relatively easy task. Such vigilance of the
courts, however, is significantly circumscribed; the focus is limited to
the opinion's judgment line and, when expressed, to the logic which
supports it.24
The opinions in the per se category, as well as those recent opin-
ions addressing similar concerns, present an interlude of decision-
making suggesting reflection. The benefit of hindsight in the years to
come will help to provide an assessment of the functional and sym-
bolic performance of the opinions in what one can describe as a revo-
lutionary epoch in the law. But the rapid turn-abouts in the law,
based predominantly upon generalized concerns and values, under-
cluded that it is impossible to reconcile independent judicial review with majority rule
although he recognized that judicial discretion must explore and focus on society's interests
and constitutional values. See Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An
Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1984). One
might ask whether the recent emphasis in Pennsylvania cases reflects perhaps a tendency or
desire to "democratize" the judicial function by making it more receptive to current
majoritarian values.
240. Not relevant to this discussion is the alternative of impeachment with respect to
judicial ethics.
score the importance of articulation. Recognizably, vision must pre-
cede direction. Many of the per se cases have demonstrated the for-
mer.24' The revolution for' and against per se rules, like most
revolutions, has largely been a negative one promoted by felicitous
phraseology, laudable goals and polemics. A glance back at many of
the pronouncements of the past reveals little articulation of the em-
pirical bases and balancing processes that promoted the creation and
destruction of per se rules, albeit limited in number. 4 In the same
regard, little focus has been given to the practical consequences of a
totality approach or, what appears to be, a standardless relativism in
terms of the administration of the law and the public's perceptions of
it.243 The abandonment of precedent and rules, no matter how short-
lived, necessarily creates a vacuum. Per se rules, for example, repre-
sented, in a sense, categorical imperatives, or a standardization of
justice - specific and understandable in scope and application. The
stringency and definiteness of such rules constituted, as we now
know, both a vice and a virtue. 44 For the thousands who must inter-
pret and administer the law, ad hoc adjudication and identification
of generalized concerns may be of limited utility. In the preoccupa-
tion with remedy, the functional necessity and benefit of guidelines,
241. Many of the cases in part V, supra, however, demonstrate a careful identification
and analysis of predominating values and legal factors.
242. The absence of empirical support for a decision has concerned others. Justice Ste-
vens' dissent in Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), criticized the majority's resolution
of a prison inmate's search and seizure claim with the observation that the majority's
• . .perception of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is not
based on any empirical data; rather, it merely reflects the perception of the four
Justices who have joined the opinion that THE CHIEF JUSTICE has authored.
104 S. Ct. at 3212.
243. The appearance of what is said and done, as well as the perceptions of the bench,
bar and public, is recognizably important. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527
(1983), Justice Brennan dissented as to the application of a totality test in assessing a search
warrant's probable cause based on an anonymous informant's tip. Frankly acknowledging that
fourth amendment rights are particularly difficult to protect because their advocates are usu-
ally criminals, Justice Brennan nevertheless cautioned that the constitutional rules were
designed to protect the innocent and guilty alike. Addressing the interaction of articulation
and values, Justice Brennan stated:
The Court's complete failure to provide any persuasive reason for rejecting
Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly reflects impatience with what it perceives to be
'overly technical' rules governing searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. Words such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'commonsense,' as
used in the Court's opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude
towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at -, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 582. See also supra note 176. Many of the Supreme Court's
opinions in criminal law during the 1983-84 term have sparked considerable criticism sug-
gesting that such decisions were based more on preferences and ideology. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, July 15, 1984, sec. 4, p.2, cols. 1-2, which speaks in Cardozo-like terms of the conserva-
tives' "predilections and prejudices, instincts and emotions;" and N.Y. Times, July 8, 1984, pp.
1, 18, which addresses the conservatives' influence in the Court.
244. The dilemma was aptly noted in a Rule 1100 context in Comment, The Pennsylva-
nia Prompt Trial Rule: Is the Remedy Worse than the Disease? 81 DICK. L. REV. 237, 264
(1977).
in matters not directly determinative of guilt and innocence, as well
as the realities of experience, have received minimal inquiry.
The subordination of precedent to notions of justice, in a system
that needs uniformity and certainty, has been a perennial problem in
the law.245 If, as Justice Cardozo once said, the courts are to under-
take the difficult task of objectifying the aspirations, convictions and
philosophies of the men and women of the times, articulation will
serve to assure others that changes - imposed and endured - re-
flect the careful consideration and balance of individual rights, pub-
lic values, utility, and costs. The investment of such an articulation is
incalculable and reaches beyond the present needs of society. There
will be those in the future who will read and turn the pages of many
of the cases discussed herein. For them the written record will re-
present their legal heritage and serve as a testament to the integrity
of our legal system - and the quality of our civilization.246
245. See CARDOZO, supra note 224, at 160, where he stated:
The conclusion of the majority of the court, whether right or wrong, is interest-
ing as evidence of a spirit and tendency to subordinate precedent to justice. How
to reconcile the tendency, which is a growing and in the main a wholesome one,
with the need of uniformity and certainty, is one of the great problems con-
fronting the lawyers and judges of our day.
246. Appellate opinions often serve as historical source material. See, e.g., G. WHITE,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT "4-95 (1978).
